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WHEN FUTURES FIGHT BACK: FOR LONG-
LATENCY INJURY CLAIMANTS IN MASS TORT
CLASS ACTIONS, ARE ASYMPTOMATIC
SUBCLASSES THE CURE TO THE DISEASE?
Samantha Y. Warshauer*
INTRODUCTION
Consider the following true scenarios of two Vietnam veterans:
Daniel Stephenson served in Vietnam from 1965 to 1970, serving
both on the ground in Vietnam and as a helicopter pilot in Vietnam.
He alleges that he was in regular contact with Agent Orange during
that time. On February 19, 1998, he was diagnosed with multiple
myeloma, a bone marrow cancer, and has undergone a bone marrow
transplant.
Joe Isaacson served in Vietnam from 1968 to 1969 as a crew chief in
the Air Force, and worked at a base for airplanes which sprayed
various herbicides, including Agent Orange. In 1996, Isaacson was
diagnosed with non-Hodgkin's lymphoma.
When the Agent Orange litigation started in 1978,2 Isaacson and
Stephenson were living healthy, productive lives and showed no signs
of injuries whatsoever from their exposure. When Judge Jack B.
Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York established the
$170,000,000 payment program component of the class settlement in
1984,' and the settlement funds ran out in 1994,4 both men still
* J.D. Candidate, 2005, Fordham University School of Law; B.A. Yale University,
2002. I would like to thank my parents Roz and Richard, my brother Lionel, and my
friends for all their encouragement and support. Special thanks go to my mentors,
Floria V. Lasky and David R. Altman.
1. Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 2001).
2. See Peter H. Schuck, Agent Orange on Trial: Mass Toxic Disasters in the
Courts 37 (1986) (describing the inception of the Agent Orange suits in 1978). The
suits alleged that the defendant chemical companies were liable for the injuries
Vietnam veterans and their families sustained, based on a variety of theories such as
negligence, strict liability, and intentional harm. See id. at 45.
3. See Jack B. Weinstein, Individual Justice in Mass Tort Litigation: The Effect
of Class Actions, Consolidations, and other Multiparty Devices 157 (1995) (analyzing
the 1984 settlement allocation). Although the value most often associated with the
settlement is $180,000,000, when the court added interest monies and split up the
settlement, $170,000,000 went into the payment fund. See id. Judge Weinstein
presided over the Agent Orange Settlement after the litigation was transferred to his
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remained asymptomatic.' The Agent Orange litigation was as far
removed from their lives as the foreign lands of Southeast Asia in
which they had fought. However, that settlement and its subsequent
depletion took on a new meaning to Joe Isaacson and Daniel
Stephenson in 1996 and 1998, respectively, when both men learned
that they had cancer.6
Because the Agent Orange settlement fund depleted in 1994, 7 both
men would have obtained a large award for their suffering if,
ironically, they had not been so healthy for so long. However, in June
of 2003, the Supreme Court handed down an ambiguous decision that
questioned whether plaintiffs such as Isaacson and Stephenson
belonged in the original class action plaintiff class at all.8 The
suggestion that future injury plaintiffs9 require special, unrealized
procedural protections challenges the legal and equitable
underpinnings of class actions today.1" Yet failure to enact procedural
reforms would allow courts to continue to tell sick people that their
cases were finished before they even began.
This Note argues that subclasses for long-latency future injury
plaintiffs could provide a procedurally sound method to combine
future and current injury plaintiffs in the same class action, albeit in
different plaintiff classes. However, this Note also identifies and
explores equally pressing procedural and constitutional problems that
a subclass for futures might unleash, including the difficulties of
district court in the Eastern District of New York. See Schuck, supra note 2, at 110.
4. See Weinstein, supra note 3, at 158 (establishing that the fund did not give out
money after 1994).
5. See Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 255 (explaining that both men manifested injuries
after 1994).
6. See id.
7. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
8. See Dow Chem. Co., v. Stephenson, 123 S. Ct. 2161 (2003) (remanding
Stephenson's claim to the Second Circuit and upholding the 2001 Second Circuit
decision permitting the veterans to sue).
9. This Note uses the phrase "future injury plaintiffs," or "futures" for short, to
encompass all holders of future claims. Accordingly, this Note refers to the problems
these plaintiffs face as the "futures problem." Cf Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The
Futures Problem, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1901, 1903 (2000) ("[A] [futures] claim is one
where a claimant cannot presently prove a causal connection between an injury and a
supposed source of injury, but nevertheless suspects or fears that he or she is suffering
injury that has its origin in the suspect source."). Hazard's definition of future claims
presumes that a putative claimant is aware of a possibly toxic exposure and thus
"suspects or fears" an injury will appear. See id; see also infra note 36 (describing
Judge Diane Wood's criticisms of Professor Hazard's commentary about the futures
problem). Professor Hazard's article ultimately suggests a proposed legislative
solution in the form a federal statute. See Hazard, supra, at 1917-18 (suggesting the
statute include methods for distributors of potentially hazardous products to register
"with a federal agency" optionally, and formulating recovery for plaintiffs based on a
formula similar to workers' compensation).
10. See Dow, 123 S. Ct. at 2161-62 (affirming the Second Circuit's decision that
future injury plaintiffs may sue despite the binding effects of the 1984 Agent Orange
settlement).
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providing notice or a collateral attack to such a class. This Note
concludes that the drawbacks of a futures subclass on the notice
requirements, bankruptcies, settlements and class action management
techniques ultimately outweigh its possible benefits as a procedurally
sound subclass for futures.
Part I discusses the procedural requirements of class actions and
how courts have interpreted previous class actions combining
plaintiffs with different interests. Also, this part gives a brief overview
of In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation," and Amchem
Products, Inc., v. Windsor,2 two litigations involving long-latency
future injury plaintiffs.
Part II of this Note observes that the Supreme Court has mandated
subclasses for future injury plaintiffs. Also, it analyzes different
circuit courts' suggestions that futures who shared a plaintiff class with
current injury plaintiffs may collaterally attack those previous
judgments. Next, this part analyzes the circuits that do not permit
such a collateral attack, and speculates whether parties could give
notice to this subclass about the class action. Part II also explains how
futures subclasses could impact defendants' settlements and
bankruptcy proceedings both beneficially and detrimentally.
Finally, Part III of this Note identifies the flaws in the Supreme
Court's confusing treatment of futures and proposes a method to
manage futures in class actions. Ultimately, this part proposes that
courts must clarify the propriety of subclasses for future injury
plaintiffs to ensure that futures are involved in class actions when
appropriate.
I. CLASS ACTION REQUIREMENTS AND MASS TORT CASES
This part provides background information about class actions and
their procedural and constitutional requirements. It also offers a brief
synopsis of the Agent Orange and asbestos mass tort class actions and
the problem of future injury plaintiffs therein. Parts I.C.1. and I.C.2.
present the asbestos and Agent Orange litigation as two case studies
exemplifying the problems of so-called long-latency future injury
plaintiffs 3 in mass tort class actions.
11. 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (approving the settlement of the Agent
Orange class action).
12. 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (decertifying a settlement-only class action of claimants
alleging injuries due to asbestos exposure).
13. In this Note, long-latency future injury plaintiffs refers to those plaintiffs who
manifest injuries a long, but indeterminate, amount of !!-Me after their exposure to a
toxin. See Stephen J. Carroll et al., RAND Inst. for Civil Justice, Asbestos Litigation
Costs and Compensation 67 (2002) (explaining that asbestos exposure creates
illnesses that have "long latency periods," and that "claimants will continue to come
forward years into the future"). In the asbestos context, Judge Weinstein projected in
1995 that claimants file 10,000 new claims per year and that this trend will continue
"every year well into the twenty-first century." See Weinstein, supra note 3, at 140.
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A. Class Actions Under Rule 23
All class actions in federal court must satisfy four prerequisites: (1)
numerosity; (2) commonality; (3) typicality; and (4) adequacy of
representation. 4 In addition, the class action must fall under one of
three categories, a limited fund class action, 5 an injunctive class
action, 6 or a class action in which aggregation is the best method to
adjudicate the class members' claims because of significant overlaps in
questions of law and fact.'7 If the parties devise a settlement, the
court must still approve it.'8 On certain occasions, parties will ask the
court to certify a class for the exclusive purpose of a settlement. 9
14. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
15. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(a)-(b). These provisions state that:
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of
subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition: (1) the prosecution of separate
actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members
of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the
party opposing the class, or (B) adjudications with respect to individual
members of the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the
interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or
substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests ....
Id.
16. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) ("[Tihe party opposing the class has acted or
refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making
appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to
the class as a whole.").
17. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) ("[T]he court finds that the questions of law or
fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy."). This type of
class action is commonly referred to as a damages class action.
18. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (explaining that "[a] class action shall not be
dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court"). Thus, the courts have
a great deal of power over class action settlements. This responsibility is "particularly
weighty when reviewing a settlement involving a non-opt-out class or future
claimants." See Manual for Complex Litigation (Third) § 30.42 (1995).
19. See Manual for Complex Litigation, supra note 18, § 30.45 ("Occasionally,
before a class is certified, parties enter into settlement agreements, which provide for
certification of a class as defined therein, for settlement purposes only. Such
settlement classes facilitate global settlements."). The manual specifies that for such
classes, judges must scrutinize the case more carefully. See id. (explaining that at an
early stage, all parties would have uncertainties resolving the "strengths and
weaknesses" of the case and the "appropriate membership of the class, and... how
class members will benefit from settlement"). In the context of settlement classes, the
manual stresses that protection of future claimants is extremely important:
The court should consider the impact of the settlement on persons who may
not currently be aware that they have a claim or whose claim may not yet
have come into existence. Since they cannot be given meaningful notice,
they may be particularly prejudiced by the settlement, and their opt-out
rights (in a Rule 23(b)(3) action) may be illusory.
Id; see also infra notes 210-45 and accompanying text (suggesting that it is impossible
to notify future injury plaintiffs).
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Finally, when there are significant divisions between the plaintiff class
members, a court may divide the class into subclasses.
2
1. Adequacy of Representation
The Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(4) adequacy of
representation requirement is similar to the 23(a)(3) requirement of
typicality in that both requirements examine any potential for conflict
within the class z.2  To fulfill the adequacy requirement, the class
representative must have claims similar to the other class members'
claims, no conflicts of interest, and an adequate counsel to represent
the class.12 When there is potential for intra-class conflict, courts are
usually less likely to find the adequacy requirement fulfilled, and
consequently may deny class action certification. 3 Courts often
scrutinize this requirement carefully, since it is an important tool to
monitor and police the "legitimacy" of a class action. 4
When a court determines that plaintiffs did not have their interests
adequately represented in the class action, those plaintiffs may
collaterally attack the action's judgment or settlement.25 Increasingly,
20. See Fed R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(B) ("[A] class may be divided into subclasses and
each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed
and applied accordingly."). Importantly, the Federal Rules do not set forth in any
detail when such a subclass is appropriate, but leave the matter open-ended for case
law and judicial interpretation.
21. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Rivlin & Jamaica D. Potts, Proposed Rule Changes to
Federal Civil Procedure May Introduce New Challenges in Environmental Class
Action Litigation, 27 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 519, 522-23 (2003) (discussing the proposed
changes to Rule 23 in relation to environmental toxins specifically, but including a
generalized discussion about Rule 23 as well).
22. See id. (highlighting that an adequate representative must also by necessity
"be competent to understand the suit and the responsibilities associated with being a
representative of the class, namely to protect the interests of absent class members
during litigation and in settlement negotiations." (citing Maywalt v. Parker & Parsley
Petroleum Co., 67 F.3d 1072, 1077-78 (2d Cir. 1995))).
23. See id. (citing Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 632 (3d Cir.
1996)); see also Georgine, 83 F.3d at 630 ("As to the first prong of the inquiry,
however, we conclude that serious intra-class conflicts preclude this class from
meeting the adequacy of representation requirement."); see infra notes 111-19 and
accompanying text (discussing adequacy of representation in the context of the
Georgine court).
24. Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions,
1999 Sup. Ct. Rev. 337, 357 (suggesting that forming a class action does not
necessarily secure rights, whereas forcing class actions to follow stringent
requirements does secure rights). Issacharoff emphasizes that it is the
representatives' "governance and managerial responsiveness" to different plaintiffs'
interests that "legitim[izes] the ability of the representatives to bind the entity." Id.
Accordingly, Issacharoff suggests that adequacy of representation "go[es] to the heart
of the class action." Id. at 373.
25. Collateral attack is "[a]n attack on a judgment entered in a different
proceeding." Black's Law Dictionary 255 (7th ed. 1999). An important concept
related to collateral attack is the doctrine of res judicata. While res judicata literally
means "a thing adjudicated," courts use the phrase to describe "[a]n issue that has
1224 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72
courts have justified such attacks by finding that inadequate
representation violates a plaintiff's due process rights.26
In Hansberry v. Lee,27 the Supreme Court delineated the contours
of the adequacy of representation requirement in the class action
context. Carl Hansberry and his family moved into an Illinois housing
development that had a land use restriction forbidding blacks, such as
the Hansberry family, from living there. 28 Respondents argued that
the decision of a prior class action 29 was binding upon Hansberry, a
new homeowner, since his residential predecessor was a plaintiff in
that class action.3°
However, Hansberry's predecessor was a plaintiff in the prior class
action seeking to enforce the restrictive housing agreement against a
limited number of defendants who were trying to breach the
agreement.31 Hansberry, although representing a plaintiff class, had
interests aligned with the defendants from the previous case, not his
residential predecessor.32 The Supreme Court found that since
Hansberry had a different set of interests than his predecessor,33 his
rights were not concluded in the previous plaintiff class of those
been definitively settled by judicial decision." Id. at 1312. Defendants use res judicata
as an affirmative defense to prevent "the same parties from litigating a second lawsuit
on the same claim, or any other claim arising from the same transaction or series of
transactions and that could have been-but was not-raised in the first suit." Id.
Thus, if a plaintiff wants to collaterally attack a prior court's judgment, a defendant
may use the res judicata affirmative defense to stymie the plaintiff's desire to re-
litigate that claim.
26. See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 24, at 352 (describing how asbestos cases
stress that an absent plaintiff's due process rights lie within the "faithfulness of the
agent that has litigated on [the absent class member's] behalf"). Issacharoff
concluded that the Court's recent decisions in Amchem and Ortiz focus more on due
process than on Rule 23 formalities. See id. at 391 (linking the critical due process
concerns to "capable representation by an agent who must be faithful to the interests
of the nonparticipants that are to be so bound").
27. 311 U.S. 32 (1940) (finding that a plaintiff class cannot consist of both those
seeking to challenge the validity of a housing agreement and those seeking to uphold
the agreement).
28. See id. at 37-38.
29. See Burke v. Kleiman, 277 I11. App. 519 (App. Ct. 1934). The Burke opinion
referred to the facts of an Illinois decision. See Hansberry v. Lee, 24 N.E.2d 37 (I11.
1939) (restricting a stretch of residential property from inhabitation by black families
in a class suit). The Illinois court reasoned that, "[t]he principle of res judicata covers
wrong as well as right decisions, for the fundamental reason that there must be an end
of litigation." See id. at 39.
30. See Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 38.
31. See id. at 45-46 (explaining that the plaintiffs in the prior class action did not
designate those defendants as representatives of a class, so that subsequent parties
seeking to invalidate the restrictive agreement did not have their rights concluded in
the prior class action).
32. See id. at 46.
33. Namely, Hansberry did not think the restrictive land agreement should apply
to him since he was not a party in the original litigation, and the defendants sought to
enforce the land restriction to include him into the scope of the Burke decision. Id. at
37-38.
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seeking to enforce the restriction.34 Thus, the Supreme Court found
that the prior class action plaintiffs did not adequately represent
Hansberry and that binding Hansberry would violate his due process
rights.35
While courts are often vigilant regarding a plaintiff's adequacy of
representation during the course of a class action, the courts establish
another hurdle by requiring the plaintiffs to provide notice to the class
about the class action's existence.
2. Notice
Both the Constitution and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
require a court to ensure that the parties provide notice to all
plaintiffs for whom a Rule 23(b)(3) class action settlement will be
binding. 36 Notice gives the plaintiff the opportunity to opt out of a
34. See id. at 44 ("Because of the dual and potentially conflicting interests of those
who are putative parties to the agreement in compelling or resisting its performance,
it is impossible to say, solely because they are parties to it, that any two of them are of
the same class."). Additionally, the Court reasoned that:
If those who thus seek to secure the benefits of the agreement were rightly
regarded by the state Supreme Court as constituting a class, it is evident that
those signers or their successors who are interested in challenging the
validity of the agreement and resisting its performance are not of the same
class in the sense that their interests are identical so that any group who had
elected to enforce rights conferred by the agreement could be said to be
acting in the interest of any others who were free to deny its obligations.
Id. at 44. Also, the Court noted that the defendants in the prior class action did not
constitute a class or represent the interests of any other people. Id. at 46 ("The
defendants in the first suit were not treated .. . as representing others or as
foreclosing by their defense the rights of others .... ").
35. See id. at 45 ("Such a selection of representatives for purposes of litigation,
whose substantial interests are not necessarily or even probably the same as those
whom they are deemed to represent, does not afford that protection to absent parties
which due process requires.").
36. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178-79 (1974) ("The usual rule
is that a plaintiff must initially bear the cost of notice to the class ... the plaintiff must
pay for the cost of notice as part of the ordinary burden of financing his own suit.").
Although plaintiffs usually finance the class notice, there are exceptions when the
parties have a pre-existing fiduciary duty, such as in the context of shareholder
derivative suits. See id; see also infra notes 41-53 and accompanying text (describing
the procedural and constitutional notice requirements).
There are other important constitutional concerns underlying the problem of
binding futures in class actions, but this Note focuses on providing adequate
constitutional notice. See Hazard, supra note 9, at 1914-15 (discussing how a
mandatory settlement-only class action might violate a future plaintiff's Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial, as well as a future plaintiff's due process right to
have a day in court).
Professor Hazard based his discussion about these two fundamental rights on
the concerns Justice Souter raised in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
As to the Seventh Amendment, the Ortiz Court seemed willing to accept that
forfeiting a right to a jury trial in the class action context is a necessary evil. See Ortiz,
527 U.S. at 846 ("By its nature, however, a mandatory settlement-only class action
with legal issues and future claimants compromises their Seventh Amendment rights
without their consent.").
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class action if the plaintiff would rather pursue the claim by other
methods.37 However, the requirement is extremely problematic for
future injury plaintiffs38 because some level of notice is always
Professor Hazard, on the other hand, seemed infinitely more troubled than
the Court by this suggestion, and followed this possibility through to the outer bounds
of its logic: "If this line of analysis governs Rule 23, no adjudication, and presumably
no settlement either, would be permissible if its effect would be to preclude a jury
trial for an absent class member." Hazard, supra note 9, at 1914-15. Importantly,
Judge Diane Wood characterized that suggestion as an "apocalyptic prediction[]."
Diane P. Wood, Commentary on The Futures Problem, By Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,
148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1933, 1937 (2000) (describing Hazard's interpretation of the Ortiz
Court "hint[ing] that all judgments under Rule 23 are invalid" as "[n]ot at all"
correct).
Hazard premised his second concern, that these settlements violate a future
plaintiff's right to a day in court, on another portion of the Court's decision in Ortiz:
[M]andatory class actions aggregating damages claims implicate the due
process "principle of general application in Anglo-American jurisprudence
that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is
not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by
service of process," it being our deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone
should have his own day in court. Although we have recognized an
exception to the general rule ... in certain limited circumstances ... the
burden of justification rests on the exception.
527 U.S. at 846 (quoting Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940)) (internal
quotations omitted).
However, Hazard sees the natural progression of this due process problem as
invalidating the use of class actions at all times. See Hazard, supra note 9, at 1915
("But if there is such a right, it surely precludes the use of a class suit for any purpose.
The very essence of a class suit is that it determines rights of individuals who are not
to have their individual day in court."). Not surprisingly, Judge Wood's response to
this notion is that Hazard "[a]gain ... goes much too far." Wood, supra, at 1939
(suggesting that class actions which expressly serve as representative tools by
necessity eliminate an absent plaintiff's day in court and do not violate that plaintiffs
due process).
37. Notice is especially important for Rule 23(b)(3) class actions because the
judgment concludes a plaintiff's rights to money damages, unless the plaintiff opts out
of the class. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (describing Rule 23(b)(3) class
actions). Importantly, recent amendments to Rule 23 create discretionary notice for
Rule 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) class actions, but the notice requirements for Rule
23(b)(3) class actions remain unchanged. See, e.g., Rivlin & Potts, supra note 21, at
538 (explaining that "the Judicial Conference did not suggest amendments to the
current notice requirement" for Rule 23(b)(3) class actions except that it should "'be
in plain, easily understood language' (citations omitted)).
38. See, e.g., Paul D. Rheingold, Mass Tort Litigation § 3:66 (2003) (positing that
it is "near-impossible" to give constitutionally adequate notice to future injury
plaintiffs). The author further suggests that futures arguably do not meet the Article
III constitutional requirement that a plaintiff present a case or controversy to support
their standing to sue. Id; see also Jeremy Gaston, Note, Standing on Its Head: The
Problem of Future Claimants in Mass Tort Class Actions, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 215 (1998)
(analyzing the standing of future injury plaintiffs and advocating a bright line rule that
courts should not afford standing to future injury plaintiffs in light of the many
competing interests at stake).
Gaston described his Note as very much "a response" to another Note
published two years before, in 1996, by the Harvard Law Review. Id. at 217 n.12
(citing Note, And Justiciability for All?: Future Injury Plaintiffs and the Separation of
Powers, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1066 (1996)). Gaston's suggestion of a bright line rule was
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necessary39 to provide plaintiffs the possibility of opting out of a
23(b)(3) class action for damages.4" It is unclear how the parties could
deliver such notice to plaintiffs who may not be aware that they are
injured.
a. Early Requirements for Notice
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
guarantees all citizens due process of the law.41 In Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,42 the Supreme Court held that in the
context of class actions, a plaintiff's "fundamental requisite of due
process" included the plaintiff's opportunity to be heard and to
choose "'whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest."'43
Additionally, the notice sent to the plaintiff must be "reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of
the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present
their objections."'  Thus, the Supreme Court determined that the
Due Process Clause requires the parties to deliver some form of
his response to the earlier Note's proposition that such a bright line rule "would be an
impermissible violation of separation of powers," and would "allow courts to do as
they please, confident that they will make the right choices in the right cases." Id.
(referring to Note, supra, at 1068). While the issue of standing may still be the subject
of debate, this Note assumes that futures do in fact have Article III standing, in order
to facilitate the discussion of constitutional notice requirements. Even if the courts
were to resolve the standing issue, the problem of how practically to disseminate
constitutional notice would remain, and is therefore worthy of treatment here.
39. See infra notes 45-52 and accompanying text (describing different
interpretations of how a court should provide notice).
40. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text (explaining the different types of
Rule 23 class actions).
41. U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law .... ).
42. 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (holding that the Central Hanover bank, when combining
funds, had a duty to notify beneficiaries by mail, as opposed to publication notice, if
the addresses of the beneficiaries were known).
43. Patrick Woolley, Rethinking the Adequacy of Adequate Representation, 75
Tex. L. Rev. 571, 620 (1997) (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314). In Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Shutts, the Court elaborated upon Mullane and found that to meet due process
requirements, "[t]he plaintiff must receive notice plus an opportunity to be heard and
participate in the litigation, whether in person or through counsel." 472 U.S. 797, 812
(1985).
44. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. In fleshing out the constitutional requirements of
due process, the Mullane Court did, however, recognize the potential ambiguities in
the Clause:
Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the
Due Process Clause but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they
require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be
preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of
the case.
Id. at 313.
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notice to plaintiffs before binding their property in a class action
judgment.45
b. Subsequent Requirements for Notice
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that the notice sent to
a plaintiff be timely, as well as "the best notice practicable under the
circumstances. '46 The plaintiff must send actual notice to members of
the class whose name and address are ascertainable before
terminating that plaintiff's right to bring a cause of action.47 Twenty-
four years after the Mullane decision, the Court refined that notice
requirement by establishing a rigorous standard for how the parties
must provide notice.48
In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,4 9 the Court held that when a
plaintiff's address is known, publication notice is unacceptable and the
court must send notice via mail.5" Any plaintiff that does not
participate in the class action proceedings is considered an absent
class member; courts afford special attention to the notice absentees
receive.51 However, notice is not always necessary to bind an absent
45. The Mullane Court distinguished between actual and constructive notice.
Actual notice is "[n]otice given directly to, or received personally by, a party." Black's
Law Dictionary, supra note 25, at 1087. Constructive notice is very different because
it is "notice presumed by law to have been acquired by a person and thus imputed to
that person." Id. at 1088. Thus, actual notice requires the parties to expend more
effort ensuring that plaintiffs receive it. Since the Mullane Court used the phrase
"reasonably calculated" to discuss notice, the Court was presumably suggesting that
constructive notice is the minimum baseline requirement. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at
314; see also supra note 36 (explaining which party is responsible for providing notice
to the plaintiffs in the class action).
46. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
47. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. However, the Mullane Court did not rule
definitively on the permissibility of publication notice when post office addresses are
not known.
48. Compare Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176 (1974) (finding in a
class action of millions of stock traders that individual notice, even when prohibitively
expensive, is necessary when plaintiffs' addresses are identifiable), with Mullane, 339
U.S. at 318 (noting that "[w]here the names and post office addresses of those
affected by a proceeding are at hand, the reasons disappear for resort to means less
likely than the mails to apprise them of its pendency").
49. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
50. See id. at 176. Since the Eisen Court mandated mailing actual notice when
plaintiffs' addresses are identifiable and prohibited just publication notice in those
situations, the Eisen requirements are more explicitly demanding than the Mullane
notice requirements.
51. See, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41-43 (1940) (explaining that "where
for any other reason the relationship between the parties present and those who are
absent is such as legally to entitle the former to stand in judgment for the latter," a
class action will be binding upon absentees without violating their due process rights).
Thus, an "absent" class member is a plaintiff who may not be present during the class
proceedings, but for whom the class action settlement or judgment is nevertheless
binding, when the class representative who was present duly represented the absent
parties' interests. See id.
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class member.52 For example, an important state interest can
outweigh an individual plaintiff's due process rights to actual notice.53
C. Mass Tort Class Actions: The Background of the "Futures"
Many scholars and the drafters of the Federal Rules themselves
have doubted the propriety of using the class action as a vehicle to
resolve mass torts.54 Nevertheless, class actions have been widely used
for mass tort cases such as airplane crashes, diet drug product liability,
and even the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 .5 However, the
52. See Woolley, supra note 43, at 619 (noting that "Shutts did not purport,
however, to hold that an absent class member may never be bound unless he has
received notice and an opportunity to be heard").
53. See id. at 620 (discussing how a government interest may subjugate the
Mullane Court's individual due process rights when the Court deems there to be a
"vital state interest" (citing Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314)). However, Woolley states that
even when such a governmental interest exists, "some quantum of due process is [still]
required." Id. Thus, if notice is impossible, the plaintiff should still be adequately
represented in order to afford the plaintiff some permutation of due process rights
despite the practical defect that there is no method to deliver any notice. Id.
Woolley bases this notion on the Mullane Court's mandate that courts ought
to strike a balance between an individual's due process rights and the government's
interest in denying those rights. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313-14. Based on Woolley's
notion that some due process interest should always survive, this balancing test is not
a zero-sum game.
54. See, for example, the Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 23, 39 F.R.D. 69,
103 (1966) [hereinafter Advisory Committee's Note]; Schuck, supra note 2, at 46 ("As
a matter of procedural law, its validity was seriously in doubt; indeed, the draftsmen
of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which authorizes the class action
device, explicitly advised against its use in such situations.").
Schuck elaborated on why class actions are often inappropriate for mass tort
accidents: "[T]he likelihood that significant questions, not only of damages but of
liability and defenses to liability, would be present, affecting the individuals in
different ways. In these circumstances an action conducted nominally as a class action
would degenerate in practice into multiple lawsuits separately tried." Id. at 65 (citing
Advisory Committee's Note, supra); see also Weinstein, supra note 3, at 126-27
(discussing criticisms by lawyers for plaintiffs and defendants, legal academics and
business world players of using aggregative devices to manage mass tort cases). Judge
Weinstein sees the fundamental conflict of using class actions to solve mass tort cases
as balancing formal rules of law with "intuitive" notions of justice:
Balancing the various equities in mass tort litigation inevitably will lead to
conflict between the rule of law-that is to say, the "formal and procedural
correctness of the means used to reach substantive results"-and justice-by
which is meant the intuitive correctness of the substantive end result of the
legal system. This conflict is not new. John Locke warned that sometimes
"a strict and rigid observation of the laws may do harm." Much of equity
jurisprudence, of course, has developed out of this tension between
predictability based on rigid rules of the past and flexibility based on present
needs of a changing society.
Id. at 127 (citations omitted). Judge Weinstein interpreted the Advisory Committee's
Notes on the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 as "specifically admonish[ing] against
using the class action device in mass tort litigation." See id. at 135. Judge Weinstein
concedes that "[in the earlier 1960s we did not fully understand the implications of
mass tort demands on our legal system." Id.
55. See Francis E. McGovern, Settlement of Mass Torts in a Federal System, 36
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Agent Orange and asbestos cases are unique in that their
physiological effects very frequently have a long latency period and
can go undetected for many years.56 Thus, these two case studies
directly capture the problem of combining current and future injury
plaintiffs within the same plaintiff class.57
1. Agent Orange
During the Vietnam War, the United States government exposed
thousands of veterans to the defoliant Agent Orange, which contains a
toxic ingredient. 8 As many veterans and their families became ill
after the war, they began filing lawsuits in 1978."9 In May of 1979, the
Wake Forest L. Rev. 871, 874-75, 886 (2001) (highlighting the fundamental
differences between "inelastic" torts such airplane crashes, which have a limited
number of plaintiffs, and "elastic" torts such as tobacco, asbestos and Agent Orange
which have virtually unlimited tort liability as potential plaintiffs can appear at any
time). Agent Orange pathologies fit into McGovern's category of "elastic" torts
because anyone exposed to Agent Orange in Vietnam could still, to this day, have yet
to manifest an injury. Although plaintiffs have used the class action vehicle for many
types of cases, Judge Weinstein has suggested that for a mass tort class action to be
appropriate, it should meet seven different criteria:
Those criteria are: (1) the concentration of decision making in one or a few
judges; (2) a single forum responsible for resolving legal and factual issues;
(3) a single substantive law; (4) adequate judicial support facilities; (5)
reasonable fact-finding procedures, particularly as to scientific issues; (6) a
cap on the total cost to defendants such as by limiting punitive damages and
allocations for pain and suffering and a method of allocating that cost among
multiple defendants; and (7) a single distribution plan with fairly inflexible
scheduled payments by injury based on the need of those injured, rather
than the social and economic status of plaintiffs, and tailored to the
availability of private resources.
Weinstein, supra note 3, at 131-32.
56. See, e.g., Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 618 (1996) (discussing
how, based on past filing data showing that asbestos related injuries can have a forty-
year latency period, "a continuing stream of claims can be expected").
57. In framing this discussion, this Note keeps the terminology regarding future
injury plaintiffs as consistent as possible with that of the Supreme Court. The Court
refers to all plaintiffs that manifest no injuries at the time of a court's judgment or
settlement (regardless of their awareness of exposure to a toxin) as everything from
"holders of... future claims," Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 856 (1999), to
"exposure-only plaintiffs," Amchem Prods., Inc., v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626 (1997).
See supra note 9 for an explanation of this Note's definition of a future injury
plaintiff.
58. See Ryan v. Dow Chem. Co., 781 F. Supp. 902, 907 (E.D.N.Y. 1991). This case
offers a comprehensive description of the Agent Orange litigation and also provides a
very thorough citation list for the entire span of the litigation. Id. at 904-07. See also
Brief for Respondents at 1 n.1, Dow Chem. Co., v. Stephenson, 123 S. Ct. 2161 (2003)
(No. 02-271) (explaining that "'Agent Orange' is generally used to describe a variety
of phenoxy herbicides used in Vietnam."). Many of those herbicides "were
contaminated with the known human carcinogen, 2,3,7,8-TCDD (dioxin)." Id.
59. See Schuck, supra note 2, at 37 (describing the first plaintiff, Paul Reutershan,
to file suit against Agent Orange manufacturers in 1978). Reutershan had an
inexplicable case of "virulent abdominal cancer," and after hearing about a Veterans
Administration study linking "health problems and exposure to Agent Orange in
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Multi-District Litigation Panel6° consolidated the Agent Orange cases,
assigning them to Judge George C. Pratt's district court in Uniondale,
Long Island, in the Eastern District of New York. 61 By 1980, Judge
Pratt had made a "preliminary" class certification, marking the
contours of the Agent Orange plaintiff class.62 While all parties were
struggling to begin discovery and think about possible settlements,
Judge Pratt announced in October of 1983 that he "could no longer
preside over the case., 6 3  Then, the Multidistrict Litigation Panel
transferred the case to Judge Jack B. Weinstein's court' in Brooklyn,
in the Eastern District of New York; he assumed jurisdiction over the
litigation and approved that class certification on December 12,
1983.65
In 1983, Judge Weinstein certified a Rule 23(b)(3) damages class,66
Vietnam," he contacted an attorney, Edward Gorman, who subsequently filed suit in
New York state court, "naming Dow and two other chemical manufacturers as
defendants." Id.
60. The Judicial Multidistrict Litigation Panel is "a group of federal judges who
decide whether to consolidate a series of closely related cases... originally brought in
disparate jurisdictions for discovery purposes and perhaps for trial as well." Schuck,
supra note 2, at 49 (explaining that Agent Orange was the largest product liability
case in which a multidistrict litigation panel had ever been involved).
61. Moving a case from state court to federal court is called "removal." See 28
U.S.C. § 1441 (2000) (explaining the type of civil actions that a party can remove from
state court to federal court). In this case, the attorneys for both the plaintiffs and
defendants wanted the case removed to federal court and petitioned the Multidistrict
Litigation Panel together. See Schuck, supra note 2, at 49. The plaintiffs' attorney,
Victor J. Yannacone, Jr., wanted to remove to avoid high transaction costs and
maintain control over the litigation personally. See id. The defendants' lawyer,
Leonard Rivkin, wanted to remove for fear that any one plaintiff's victory against the
chemical company could be used by all the plaintiffs to secure victories by the
doctrine of offensive collateral estoppel. Id. That doctrine would permit other
plaintiffs to "prevent a defendant from relitigating an issue previously decided against
the defendant and for another plaintiff." Black's Law Dictionary, supra note 25, at
256. Thus, Rivkin feared that without removal, one plaintiff's win against the
defendants would be a death knell for their entire case. See Schuck, supra note 2, at
49; see also Ryan, 781 F. Supp. at 907 (stating that the Multidistrict Panel transferred
"over 600 cases involving about 15,000 plaintiffs to the Eastern District of New
York").
62. See Brief for Respondents at 2, Dow (No. 02-271) (explaining that the original
certification did not include asymptomatic veterans, only those manifesting injuries);
Schuck, supra note 2, at 126 (describing Weinstein's certification of the class).
63. See Schuck, supra note 2, at 110 (citing the letter that Judge Pratt sent to
Judge Andrew Caffrey, chairman of the Multidistrict Litigation Panel). Judge Pratt
had been "elevated to the Court of Appeals more than a year earlier but had retained
the Agent Orange case on his docket." Id. His letter to Judge Caffrey cited "'the
increasing pressure of work in the Circuit Court"' as the reason that "he could no
longer preside over the case." Id.
64. See id.
65. See Brief for Respondents at 3, Dow (No. 02-271) (explaining that Judge
Weinstein approved Pratt's class representatives, albeit still "unidentified," and that
the class did not include asymptomatic veterans).
66. See Ryan, 781 F. Supp. at 908 (citing In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.,
100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983)). A Rule 23(b)(3) class "with opt-out rights was
created to try the fundamental common question of the causal relationship between
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as well as a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) limited fund class 67 to provide for
punitive damage claims. Then, the court had to authorize notice to
members of that Rule 23(b)(3) class.68 Judge Weinstein "authorized"
the plaintiffs to mail notice to people who had either filed claims in
court or registered in the Agent Orange Registry.69 For everyone else,
he permitted radio and television advertisements on a global scale,
and newspaper announcements in the United States, Australia, and
New Zealand. 70 Although the 23(b)(3) class the court certified did not
include future injury plaintiffs, the Settlement Agreement in 1984
included them.7' Consequently, when they later manifested injuries,
dioxin and plaintiffs' injuries." Id. Importantly, one of the main reasons Judge
Weinstein was able to certify the class as a Rule 23(b)(3) class action, where
aggregation is the most effective means of proceeding, was the "government contract"
defense. See Schuck, supra note 2, at 61 (explaining the theory that since the
government controlled the manufacturing of the herbicide, the manufacturers were
not liable). Amongst other legal issues all plaintiffs had in common, such as Agent
Orange's "defectiveness," all defendants had the same affirmative government
contract defense. See id. at 64 (explaining that not only did the veterans meet the
numerosity requirement of Rule 23, but they also shared "many of the factual and
legal claims (for example, the government contract defense and the issue of Agent
Orange's defectiveness) [which] had to be resolved in the same way for all"); see also
Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 252 (2d Cir. 2001) (explaining that the
district court based its class certification on the government contract defense, "that
those questions predominate over any questions affecting individual members," and
that a class action would be "superior to all other methods" of adjudication (citing In
re "Agent Orange," 100 F.R.D. at 729)).
67. A Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class action is commonly referred to as a "limited fund"
class action because courts use it when plaintiffs all seek redress from a limited
amount of funds that could run out, leaving some plaintiffs at a disadvantage. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B) (establishing the use of class actions for "adjudications with
respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical matter be
dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or
substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests"). For Agent
Orange, the trial court created that limited fund class "without opt-out rights" to
"cover plaintiffs' punitive damage claims." Ryan, 781 F. Supp. at 908.
68. The class definition was:
[T]hose persons who were in the United States, New Zealand or Australian
Armed Forces at any time from 1961 to 1972 who were injured while in or
near Vietnam by exposure to Agent Orange or other phenoxy herbicides....
The class also includes spouses, parents, and children of the veterans born
before January 1, 1984, directly or derivatively injured as a result of the
exposure.
Id. at 908 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
69. See Schuck, supra note 2, at 127. Schuck also mentions that the veterans'
lawyers had proposed this "solution" to the notification problem. See id.
70. See id. In addition, Judge Weinstein ordered a toll-free telephone number
that veterans could call for more information about the lawsuit. Id. Also, Judge
Weinstein sent "letters from the court requesting each state governor to use all efforts
to notify veterans in their states." Id. Schuck characterizes this notice as "innovative
but highly questionable as a matter of law," id., because Weinstein ignored the Eisen
standard of ascertaining mailing addresses "through reasonable effort," id. at 126.
71. See Ryan, 781 F. Supp. at 908 ("Concerned with the potential for new actions
and recognizing the need for finality, the Settlement Agreement expressly stated that
'[t]he class specifically includes persons who have not yet manifested injury."') (citing
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those future injury plaintiffs' only recourse was the money the 1984
settlement provided; after 1994 the original settlement fund provided
nothing.72
2. Asbestos
Asbestos is a heat and fire-resistant material used by many
industries, for much of the twentieth century, in a large variety of
products.73 Over twenty-one million Americans have been exposed to
asbestos in both commercial and industrial settings.74 In 1970,
Congress banned the use of asbestos in industrial settings.75
In 1973, the first occupational asbestos-exposure suit named
asbestos manufacturers as defendants. 76 The plaintiff prevailed on a
In re "Agent Orange," 597 F. Supp. at 865). Thus, the court did not provide notice to
future injury plaintiffs, whom it could not identify in the first place, yet bound them in
the class action settlement because of "the need for finality." Id.
The final settlement included many provisions, most notably that defendants
would pay $180,000,000 plus interest to the plaintiffs, that the class included those
currently asymptomatic and that a special distribution plan would primarily take care
of veterans' children. See Schuck, supra note 2, at 171. For those born after the
settlement, the settlement allocated $45,000,000 to-a fund with a twenty-five year "life
span." See id. at 220. That fund, the Agent Orange Class Assistance Program, made
grants to agencies helping Vietnam veterans and gave money to families of veterans
as well; it constituted approximately 25% of the $180,000,000 fund, plus interest. See
Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 253 (2d Cir. 2001). For more
information about the Agent Orange Class Assistance Program, see infra notes 128-
29, referring to the Agent Orange Payment Program. Judge Weinstein calculated the
final distribution numbers, interest included, to be $170,000,000 for the Payment
Program, $55,000,000 to the Class Assistance Plan, $5,000,000 to Australian and New
Zealand trusts, and $10,000,000 for plaintiffs' attorneys' fees. See Weinstein, supra
note 3, at 157.
72. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text (describing the time frame for the
Agent Orange settlement fund). While the settlement payment program expired in
1994, the Class Assistance Plan's funds did survive. See Ryan, 781 F. Supp. at 910. A
board of Vietnam veteran advisors oversees the funds the Class Assistance Program
pays out. See id. at 911. The program has paid out millions of dollars to "local and
national Vietnam veterans' groups, agencies serving adults and children with
disabilities, and agencies providing family counseling." Id. Thus, those funds go to
veterans organizations and agencies that help Vietnam veterans and their children
who suffer disabilities. Importantly, that fund does not provide a secondary recourse
for Vietnam veterans who manifested their injuries after 1994 and are ineligible for
the Agent Orange Payment Program. See id. at 910.
73. See Weinstein, supra note 3, at 139 (listing how asbestos is present in
insulation for "buildings, water and steam pipes, ships, and many other connections
such as brake linings and fire retardant curtains").
74. See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 736 (Bankr. E. &
S.D.N.Y. 1991); Jody L. Gallegos, Three Decades of Frustration: Finally, A Solution
to the Asbestos Problem, 15 St. John's J. Legal Comment. 61, 63 (2000) (exploring
Congress's Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act and its possible benefits for the
asbestos litigation).
75. See Gallegos, supra note 74, at 63-64 (describing the Federal Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970).
76. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods., Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973)
(giving judgment to the plaintiff and finding liability for different asbestos
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theory of strict liability.77 By 1982, the litigation had produced 21,000
claimants, 300 defendants, three bankruptcies, and one billion dollars
in transaction costs. 7  To manage this high volume of litigation, the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation 79 consolidated all the federal
suits and moved them to the federal district court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania.80
Once the Multidistrict Litigation Panel consolidated the cases, the
attorneys reached a settlement agreement allowing the defendants to
pay a set amount of money to extinguish all present and future claims,
without having to admit liability.8' To "effectuate" this settlement,82
the transferee claimants had to pick a representative 83 and form a class
action under the requirements of Rule 23.84 The district judge
certified the class,85 and the defendants appealed. 6 Ultimately, the
Supreme Court found that this class of asbestos claimants could not be
certified for a class action, even solely for settlement purposes,87
because the plaintiff class improperly included plaintiffs with different
medical conditions.8 Although no court has since certified a class of
asbestos claimants, there are currently Multidistrict Litigation Panels
manufacturers); see also Schuck, supra note 2, at 34 (describing how the Fifth Circuit
rejected the manufacturers' defenses and "applied expansive product liability
principles" to the case).
77. See Borel, 493 F.2d at 1089-91. Strict liability is "[l]iability that does not
depend on actual negligence or intent to harm, but that is based on the breach of an
absolute duty to make something safe." Black's Law Dictionary, supra note 25, at 926.
78. See Carroll et al., supra note 13, at 51.
79. See Gallegos, supra note 74, at 72 (explaining that a Judicial Conference Ad
Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation met in 1990 and recommended that the
Multidistrict Litigation Panel transfer and consolidate the cases).
80. See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., No. VI, 771 F. Supp 415, 424 (J.P.M.L.
1991) (consolidating and transferring the federal asbestos suits to one district for pre-
trial determinations).
81. See Gallegos, supra note 74, at 72 (explaining that the settlement "dispos[ed]
of all pending and future claims against the defendant companies").
82. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (describing the settlement-only class
action).
83. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text (describing the adequacy of
representation requirements).
84. See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text (explaining the Rule 23
requirements in general).
85. See Gallegos, supra note 74, at 72 (noting that Judge Charles Weiner found
that this class met the Rule 23 certification requirements).
86. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding that
the class failed many Rule 23 requirements, such as typicality, adequacy of
representation, predominance and superiority); see also infra notes 111-20, 212-18 and
accompanying text (providing a more thorough analysis of the Third Circuit's
decision).
87. See infra notes 167-73, 221-27 and accompanying text (explaining the Supreme
Court's decision in 1999 decertifying the class).
88. See Amchem Prods., Inc., v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626 (1997) (finding that
plaintiffs with different medical conditions should be in a "discrete subclass[]").
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that operate as nerve centers to manage asbestos claims brought in
many federal districts.89
While state courts have generated assorted solutions for managing
asbestos litigation,90 the multitude of suits has put an enormous strain
on defendants,91 insurance companies' and the courts.9 3 One study
found that no less than five large companies have each spent over one
billion dollars on asbestos litigation.94 Also, as defendant companies
become insolvent, they place a strain on plaintiffs and other
defendants."
One commentator has urged that asbestos class actions are wholly
different from other mass torts and require "a true alternative
resolution process."96  There are two primary factors that make
asbestos a unique problem. First, exposure to asbestos can produce
illnesses with a latency period of thirty or forty years or more.97
89. See, e.g., Frederick C. Dunbar & Denise Neumann Martin, Clearing Uninjured
Plaintiffs from the Tort System: The Road to a Solution, Legal Backgrounder, July 25,
2003 (noting that the panel operating out of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania runs
very efficiently and has adopted certain court practices to manage asbestos cases).
90. See id. (explaining how many state courts have instituted reforms such as an
"inactive docket" for "unimpaired claimants").
91. See Carroll et al., supra note 13, at 53 (estimating that as of 2000, defendants
have spent between twenty and twenty-four billion dollars).
92. See id. (estimating that insurance companies in the United States have spent
twenty-two billion dollars on asbestos costs).
93. See Dunbar & Martin, supra note 89 (citing techniques to help courts clear
their overburdened dockets and limit the number of claims plaintiffs are filing in the
court systems); see also Weinstein, supra note 3, at 141 ("Moreover, as one judge has
noted, 'our attempt to try these virtually identical lawsuits, one-by-one, will bankrupt
both the state and federal court systems."' (citing Spencer Williams, Mass Tort Class
Actions: Going, Going, Gone?, 98 F.R.D. 323,324 (1983))).
94. See Carroll et al., supra note 13, at 53 (estimating that of the defendants
litigating, at least five of them have spent over one billion dollars as a result of the
litigation).
95. See id. at 67 (explaining that bankruptcy trusts take money away from current
injury claimants to reserve it for future claims, and force plaintiffs to sue other,
solvent defendant companies). A bankruptcy trust is a fund a company establishes
when it emerges from bankruptcy to pay off its liabilities. See id. The most well-
known example of a bankruptcy trust is the Manville Trust. See infra note 279
(describing the fate of the MPIST, the Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust).
96. Mary J. Davis, Toward the Proper Role for Mass Tort Class Actions, 77 Or. L.
Rev. 157, 163 (1998). Davis suggests that "[s]eparating asbestos litigation from the
rest of the mass tort world, however, does not require the further conclusion that class
actions are inappropriate for other mass torts." Id. at 164. Davis advocates the
propriety of class actions for mass torts "involving widespread personal injury,
currently manifested or reasonably certain to occur, caused by a discrete, though not
necessarily a small, number of potentially culpable defendants whose allegedly
tortious behavior was/is widely directed to the consuming public." Id. at 163. Davis's
suggestions about the unique nature of the asbestos problem, as compared to other
mass torts, are worthy of note. However, her suggestions make no attempt to address
the futures problem. See id.
97. Toxic Torts: Tort Actions for Cancer and Lung Disease Due to
Environmental Pollution 150 (Paul D. Rheingold et al. eds., 1977).
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Second, brief exposure to asbestos can cause illness.98 Thus, the
number of people who have inhaled asbestos is enormous and the
span of time during which those people will manifest asbestos-related
injuries is extremely long.99 Although past attempts to certify an
asbestos class action have failed,"°° the scope of this litigation suggests
that courts must keep searching for an efficient way to manage the
asbestos problem."' °
Although Agent Orange and asbestos have different histories in the
courts, both sets of litigation illustrate that future injury plaintiffs may
not recover compensation when they do become ill. For Vietnam
veterans exposed to Agent Orange or workers exposed to asbestos,
the courts might have to make procedural modifications to Rule 23
class actions to accommodate the futures and their putative claims:
futures may belong in a distinct plaintiff subclass, but such a solution
raises important and unresolved legal and policy-based questions.
Part II explores these issues.
II. IS THE FUTURES SUBCLASS A CURE?: LEGAL AND POLICY
CONCERNS IN CONFLICT
This part examines the confusion in the current legal landscape
surrounding the role of future injury plaintiffs in mass tort class
actions. First, Part II.A. addresses the legal considerations underlying
the possible solution of many courts, including the most recent
Supreme Court decision on the issue, °2 to place current and future
injury plaintiffs into different subclasses to create a procedurally
viable class action. This section discusses which legal considerations
some courts have contemplated in support of the futures subclass
cure, then examines the opposing legal considerations courts have
espoused weighing against the futures subclass cure.
Next, Part II.B. addresses the policy considerations underlying the
futures subclass cure. First, it discusses how futures subclasses would
increase defendants' incentives to settle. Then, it discusses how
futures subclasses would further the goals of the tort system and assist
administrative mass tort compensation schemes, such as bankruptcies.
98. Id. (explaining that "a day, a week, a month" of exposure can lead to disease
because the inhaled asbestos fibers "remain in the lung").
99. See Gallegos, supra note 74 and text accompanying note 75 for a description
of Congress's ban on asbestos in the workplace. However, containment of asbestos
still remains an issue and some authorities argue that removal can be more dangerous
than containment. Toxic Torts, supra note 97, at 155 (suggesting that disposal of
structures containing asbestos raises "thorny problems").
100. E.g., Amchem Prods., Inc., v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); see supra text
accompanying note 88 (describing the Supreme Court's decision not to certify an
asbestos plaintiff class in 1997).
101. See supra notes 90-99 and accompanying text (describing the scope of the
asbestos problem and the problems ensuing from the asbestos litigation).
102. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 123 S. Ct. 2161 (2003).
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Finally, this section explores how futures subclasses might just as
easily vitiate defendants' settlement incentives and the benefits of
current bankruptcy schemes.
A. The Futures Subclass Cure: Legal Considerations
The Supreme Court has suggested that future injury plaintiffs
require a distinct subclass from current injury plaintiffs to adequately
represent their rights. °3 Also, a few circuit courts support a collateral
attack by absent class members"° when intra-class conflicts have
arisen during the litigation, jeopardizing their adequacy of
representation. 5 However, other circuits have found that a futures
subclass may not retroactively attack such judgments. 6 Furthermore,
many courts have suggested that a futures subclass cannot exist at all
because courts have no feasible means of providing notice to such
plaintiffs. 7
1. Future Injury Plaintiffs Should Occupy Their Own Subclass
Different courts have suggested that futures cannot be adequately
represented in a plaintiff class with the currently injured, and require
103. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); Amchem, 521 U.S. at
591. To be certified as a plaintiff class, this subclass would also have to meet the
requirements of numerosity, commonality and typicality. See supra notes 14-20 and
accompanying text (describing the Rule 23 class action requirements). While
commonality and typicality could be problematic for a group of futures, the Supreme
Court has suggested that the adequacy requirement carries more import than the
other requirements because of its constitutional repercussions. See supra notes 21-35
(explaining the importance of the adequacy of representation requirement and the
link between adequacy of representation and due process rights). Thus, this Note
operates on the assumption that for the courts to certify a futures subclass, adequacy
of representation is the most important requirement; courts may overlook the
commonality and typicality requirements because the futures present such an
anomalous problem in class actions.
104. See supra note 51 (describing an absent class member).
105. See, e.g., Williams v. Gen. Elec. Capital Auto Lease Inc., 159 F.3d 266, 269-70
(7th Cir. 1998) (explaining how intra-class conflicts can arise and turn adequacy of
representation from adequate to inadequate); Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 72
(5th Cir. 1973) (setting forth a two-prong inquiry for collateral attack that is aware of
changing conditions and the potential for intra-class conflict to develop over time); see
also supra notes 21-35 and accompanying text (explaining the background of the Rule
23(a)(4) adequacy of representation requirement).
106. E.g., Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 179 F.3d 641, 648 (9th Cir. 1999) (denying
collateral review as a necessary measure to uphold a plaintiff's due process).
107. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 628 ("[W]e recognize the gravity of the question whether
class action notice sufficient under the Constitution and Rule 23 could ever be given
to legions so unselfconscious and amorphous."). This Note refers to the
"selfconsciousness" of futures to indicate the point in time at which futures realize
they have an injury (whether patent or latent), that a class action of plaintiffs might
already be in the process of litigating. Futures are "unselfconscious" until they come
to this realization.
1238 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72
a distinct subclass to do SO. 108 Also, many circuit courts have found
that certain absent plaintiffs may collaterally attack a judgment if the
class representative could not adequately represent their interests
throughout the litigation.109 Consequently, certain judgments and
settlements that concluded the rights of future injury claimants in the
same plaintiff class as current injury claimants may not be binding on
futures.110
a. The Third Circuit: Present and Future Injury Plaintiffs Cannot
Comprise the Same Plaintiff Class
The Third Circuit, in Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc.,111 found
that future and present injury plaintiffs have interests that are
108. See, e.g., infra notes 111-19, 138-41 and accompanying text (describing the
Third and Second Circuits' findings on adequacy of representation).
109. E.g., Twigg v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 153 F.3d 1222 (11th Cir. 1998); Gonzales,
474 F.2d at 67.
110. See, e.g., infra note 140 and accompanying text (explaining the Second
Circuit's recent holding that certain futures were not proper parties to the class action
and therefore, are not subject to the class action's binding effects). It is extremely
important to emphasize at this juncture that the Second Circuit adopted a very
nuanced line of reasoning about collateral attack by futures. See supra note 25 and
accompanying text (defining collateral attack).
In the context of Agent Orange and futures manifesting injury after 1994, the
Second Circuit decided that those futures were not proper parties to the litigation in
the first place. See Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 257-58 (2d Cir. 2001)
("[P]laintiffs' suit can go forward because there has been no prior adequacy of
representation determination with respect to individuals whose claims arise after the
depletion of the settlement fund."). Therefore, they can sue despite the res judicata
effects of the 1984 settlement. See supra note 25 (defining res judicata). Importantly,
the Second Circuit found that, "plaintiffs' collateral attack, which seeks only to prevent
the prior settlement from operating as res judicata to their claims, is permissible."
Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 257 (emphasis added).
Thus, the plaintiffs were not performing a broad collateral attack to re-open
the substance of the settlement; they were narrowly attacking the settlement just to
prove that it did not pertain to their claims. Id. The plaintiffs did not contest that the
settlement treated them unfairly, but contested that the settlement did not treat them
at all, a contention with which the Second Circuit agreed. Id. (illustrating the Second
Circuit's decision that "plaintiffs' collateral attack is allowed" and would not violate
the defendants' due process rights).
However, for this Note's analysis of circuit courts other than the Second
Circuit, "collateral attack" refers to a subsequent attack on a judgment or settlement's
substance and procedure, not the limited attack the Second Circuit discussed for
plaintiffs who were not proper parties to a settlement. Specifically, this Note
discusses collateral attack as a possible method for futures to re-open settlements that
improperly combined them in the same plaintiff subclass as current injury claimants,
thereby violating their right to Rule 23(a)(4) adequate representation. See infra notes
147-63 and accompanying text (describing the Fifth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits'
use of collateral attack for absent class members). These circuits use the collateral
attack doctrine for futures who were proper parties to the suit and subsequent
settlement, but had the wrong plaintiff classmates.
111. 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996) (decertifying a settlement-only class of asbestos
plaintiffs). See supra note 19 and accompanying text for a description of a settlement-
only class.
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inherently at odds with each other.112  Although the Georgine trial
court approved named class representatives that included both
present and future injury plaintiffs, the Third Circuit highlighted the
trial court's faulty assumption: the inclusion of future injury plaintiffs
as representatives does not necessarily mean that future injury
plaintiffs can be sufficiently represented in the first place when
combined with present injury plaintiffs in a single plaintiff class."'
In particular, the court enumerated some of the factors that make it
nearly impossible to align present and future injury plaintiffs in the
same plaintiff class. The factors included conflicts in settlement
provisions regarding capped payments,' 4 inflation protection,"' and
delayed opt-out rights."6 The Third Circuit concluded that the intra-
class conflicts between the currently and future injured, in addition to
other possible rifts within the plaintiff class," 7 "preclude this class
from meeting the adequacy of representation requirement.""1
8
112. See id. at 630. See also supra notes 14-26 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Rule 23 requirements and adequacy of representation. The Supreme
Court relied upon the Third Circuit's line of reasoning one year later when the
Supreme Court heard the case on appeal. See Amchem Prods., Inc., v. Windsor, 521
U.S. 591 (1997).
113. See Georgine, 83 F.3d at 630. See also supra notes 14-26 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Rule 23 requirements and adequacy of representation.
114. Georgine, 83 F.3d at 630-31 (discussing how presently injured plaintiffs would
want the bulk, if not all, of their funds immediately whereas future injury plaintiffs
would "want reduced current payouts (through caps on compensation awards and
limits on the number of claims that can be paid each year)").
115. Id. (explaining that future injury plaintiffs would want protections against
inflation that would devalue their funds when and if they recover their chunk of the
settlement funds at a later date). The court discusses additional protective features
the future injury plaintiffs would like in the settlement, such as "not having preset
limits on how many cases can be handled" as well as "limiting the ability of defendant
companies to exit the settlement." Id.
116. Id. (describing how futures by necessity lack certainty about their plight, as it
unravels in the future, and would therefore "probably desire a delayed opt out"
right). On the opposing side, the currently injured plaintiffs would not want a delayed
opt out right, "as the more people locked into the settlement, the more likely it is to
survive." Id. at 631 & n.14 (citing the testimony of a representative plaintiff named
Anna Baumgartner, whose husband died of mesothelioma, stating her belief that
futures do not deserve to be compensated). Mesothelioma is "cancer of the pleural
membrane around the lungs and organs." Michelle J. White, Why the Asbestos Genie
Won't Stay in the Bankruptcy Bottle, 70 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1319, 1319 n.1 (2002).
Very minimal exposure to asbestos fibers can cause mesothelioma. See
Georgine, 83 F.3d at 633. Additionally, the family member of someone minimally
exposed to such fibers can contract mesothelioma as well. Id. The Third Circuit
pointed out that "[t]he unpredictability of mesothelioma is further exacerbated by the
long latency period between exposure to asbestos and the onset of the disease,
typically between fifteen to forty years." Id. Finally, mesothelioma is extremely
painful, always fatal, "generally within two years of diagnosis," and solely caused by
asbestos. Id.
117. Georgine, 83 F.3d at 631-33 (explaining that this class failed other procedural
requirements as well, such as typicality and class action superiority to other methods
of adjudication).
118. Id. at 630. One of the main reasons the Third Circuit disapproved of this
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However, the court suggested that with certain "structural
protections," future injury plaintiffs could adequately represent their
interests in the same class action as current injury plaintiffs. " 9
The Third Circuit's decision that present and future injury claimants
must constitute a separate subclass 120 suggests that futures who shared
a class with current injury plaintiffs never had a representative that
settlement between presently injured and futures was that a settlement "makes
important judgments on how recovery is to be allocated among different kinds of
plaintiffs, decisions that necessarily favor some claimants over others." Id. The court
described how plaintiffs with "asymptomatic pleural thickening" get no money
whatsoever, and patients who contract mesothelioma fifteen years after the
settlement was approved would only receive an award that was tiny in comparison to
what they could receive in the traditional tort system. Id.
Additionally, the Third Circuit used an example from the Manville
Bankruptcy reorganization, where the trial court placed asbestos claimants and co-
defendant manufacturers in the same subclass to illustrate the impropriety of placing
groups with starkly different interests within the same subclass. Id. at 631 ("'Their
interests are profoundly adverse to each other. The health claimants wish to receive
as much as possible from the co-defendant manufacturers, and the latter wish to hold
their payment obligations to a minimum."' (quoting In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos
Litig., 982 F.2d 721, 739 (2d Cir. 1992), modified sub nom. Findley v. Blinken, 993
F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993))).
The court further explained that housing different groups in their respective
subclasses would also ensure that a representative of each subclass could adequately
represent the interests of that subgroup in case of a settlement, without the confusion
of combining interests within one all-encompassing settlement class. Id. at 631
("'[A]dversity among subgroups requires that the members of each subgroup cannot
be bound to a settlement except by consents given by those who understand that their
role is to represent solely the members of their respective subgroups."' (quoting In re
Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 982 F.2d at 743)). See also infra notes 138-41 for a
discussion of how the Second Circuit in 2001 also viewed intra-class conflicts as
precluding adequacy of representation findings for futures.
119. See Georgine, 83 F.3d at 631 ("Absent structural protections to assure that
differently situated plaintiffs negotiate for their own unique interests, the fact that
plaintiffs of different types were among the named plaintiffs does not rectify the
conflict."). The Third Circuit emphasized that the mere presence of current and
future injury plaintiffs in a class action does not guarantee that each will have the
capacity to adequately represent their respective injuries. Thus, the court reasoned
that the differently situated claimants could only "rectify" their adequacy of
representation conflicts with certain "structural protections." Id.
Although the court did not go into detail about what type of "structural
protections" it envisioned to make sure that "differently situated plaintiffs" could
represent their respective interests, it has certainly left open the possibility that
different subclasses could be the cure. See infra notes 250-81 and accompanying text
(discussing the benefits of distinct subclasses to protect future injury plaintiffs).
However, the court did specifically state in Georgine that the best mechanism for
reform was "from the policy-makers, not the courts." Id. at 634. Harmonizing the
court's desire for "structural protections" and their emphasis on the power of
Congress as opposed to the courts, the Third Circuit seemingly implicates the
necessity of legislative reform of structured settlements to solve the problem of the
futures. See id.; see also infra note 290 and accompanying text (exploring the
possibility of legislative reform for the futures problem).
120. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (explaining the Third Circuit's
finding that futures could not adequately represent their interests within a plaintiff
class including current injury plaintiffs).
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met the Rule 23(a)(4) adequacy of representation requirement.
Certain circuits'2 ' have suggested that absent class members' 2  may
collaterally attack 13 a judgment if the class representative did not
adequately represent the interests of the entire class.
b. Implications of the Subclass Cure: An Inadequately Represented
Futures Subclass May Litigate Its Rights Independently
The Second Circuit has recognized divisions between future injury
plaintiffs based upon eligibility for Agent Orange Payment Program
compensation.2 4  In the past, it did not address the possibility that
futures ineligible for settlement funds 125 might pursue their legal rights
121. See, e.g., Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2001); Gonzales
v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973).
122. See supra note 51 (defining an absent class member).
123. See supra note 25 (defining collateral attack). See also supra note 110 for an
explanation of how the Second Circuit has used a narrow form of collateral attack,
but how other circuits use the theory more broadly to re-open past settlements and
judgments.
124. Ivy v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 996 F.2d 1425, 1437-38 (2d Cir. 1993)
(finding that any futures eligible for settlement compensation had no cause of action).
125. See supra note 9 (explaining that for this Note's general purposes, futures are
all holders of a future claim, regardless of exposure-awareness or injury manifestation
date). Thus, Ivy was helpful because it recognized that not all futures face the same
circumstances, but ultimately was not fruitful because in 1993, all Agent Orange
futures were still eligible for one more year. 996 F.2d at 1436; see supra notes 3-4 and
accompanying text (discussing the timeframe for the Agent Orange settlement fund).
Importantly, all plaintiffs with long-latency futures injuries may have
competing interests with those futures who manifest symptoms early on and have the
first chance to get funds. Any settlement arrangement or judgment allocating any
amount of funds could always run out before a possibly infinite number of futures
manifest their injuries. Therefore, the situation of the post-1994 Ivy plaintiffs
represents the possible situation any future injury plaintiff could face when the fund
or dollar amount that purported to compensate them runs out. This theory also holds
true for asbestos, even though there are no equivalent eligibility dates.
However, when the Supreme Court examined the futures problem in the
asbestos context, it ignored fund eligibility issues and intra-futures discrepancies by
only discussing "exposure-only" plaintiffs. See Amchem Prods., Inc., v. Windsor, 521
U.S. 591, 626 (1997) (contrasting current injury plaintiffs with "exposure-only"
plaintiffs); cf. Wood, supra note 36, at 1934 (recognizing possible rifts between
futures, since "at least some kinds of futures cases may be amenable to reform").
Wood distinguishes between plaintiffs who are aware of their exposure and therefore
presently identifiable, and those who are unaware and only "identifiable only at a
much later time." Id. at 1934-35 (explaining how difficult it is for courts to manage
claims when "the claimants themselves have no reason to suspect" the claims exist);
see also supra note 9 (specifying that Professor Hazard's definition of a future injury
claimant includes those aware or "suspect" of injury due to exposure).
Judge Wood nevertheless characterizes her distinction between futures as
optimistic for the futures problem because courts can presumably handle the futures
who are aware of their exposure since that group could "knowingly settle a claim,
agree to medical monitoring, or in some other intelligent way participate in a suit
designed to resolve definitively claims relating to past behavior that will not recur."
Wood, supra note 36, at 1941.
Judge Wood suggests for the other group of futures that are unaware and
"cannot intelligently participate in present litigation," the traditional tort claim system
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despite the effects of res judicata. Recently, the Second Circuit
recognized that futures ineligible for compensation needed a distinct
subclass; without that subclass, those futures may proceed with their
suit despite the 1984 settlement and its res judicata effects.126 Finally,
the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have recognized the
propriety of collateral attack when intra-class divisions occur after the
initial adequacy of representation determination, vitiating that
determination. 127
i. The Second Circuit: The Courts Did Not Create All Futures Equal
For Vietnam veterans, the structure of the Agent Orange
Settlement Fund clearly delineated which future injury claimants were
included in the class action settlement. 128  However, subsequent
will have to remain the most viable solution. Id. Thus, Wood would presumably limit
a subclass of futures to only those who are aware of their exposure. However, even
though future claimants may be aware of exposure, if they have not manifested any
injury, they may not necessarily have any reason to "knowingly" or "intelligently"
participate. Id. See also infra notes 257-62 and accompanying text which suggests the
repercussions of too many claimants improperly in the tort system, thereby
supporting Wood's suggestion that only certain futures should be in the tort system.
126. Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding that
plaintiffs suffering from long-latency Agent Orange injuries manifesting after 1994
were not bound by the 1984 settlement); see also supra note 110 (explaining the
difference between a broad collateral attack and the Second Circuit's findings that
post-1994 injury manifestation veterans were not proper parties in the first place).
127. See infra notes 147-63 and accompanying text (explaining the three circuits
supporting collateral attack).
128. The settlement in 1984 purported to bind all Americans, Australians and New
Zealanders who had served in Vietnam between the years of 1961 and 1972,
regardless of when they manifested their injuries. See supra note 71 and
accompanying text (discussing the terms of the Agent Orange Settlement); see also
Schuck, supra note 2, at 126 (explaining in great detail Judge Weinstein's class
definition). However, the 1984 fund only provided compensation for injured class
members until 1994. See id. at 220 (highlighting that although the courts scheduled the
$180,000,000 fund to last ten years, the court made additional provisions that would
survive twenty-five years after the settlement). Although looking prospectively in
1984, ten years seemed sufficient to include all possible Agent Orange related injures
that could manifest in the future, that ten-year projection proved incorrect. See Ryan
v. Dow Chem. Co., 781 F. Supp. 902, 919 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) ("These plaintiffs, like all
class members who suffer death or disability before the end of 1994, are eligible for
compensation from the Agent Orange Payment Fund."). The Second Circuit further
suggested that "[tjhe relevant latency periods and the age of the veterans ensure[s]
that almost all valid claims will be revealed before that time." Id.
The Second Circuit issued the Ryan decision in 1989. Five years after the
court established the settlement fund, most courts still had no idea that a multitude of
long-latency injuries would manifest down the road, as late as 2003 and after. Current
research data on toxic latency periods, however, harbors no such delusions and fully
recognizes that the long-latency periods are a large, indeterminate problem for toxins
such as Agent Orange and asbestos. See, e.g., Carroll et al., supra note 13, at 67
("Because illness from asbestos exposure is characterized by long latency periods, it is
likely that claimants will continue to come forward years into the future."); see also
The Legacy of Vietnam Veterans and Their Families (Dennis K. Rhoades et al. eds.,
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courts' interpretations of that settlement have highlighted that long-
latency future injury plaintiffs were inadequately represented in the
settlement proceedings.'29
In Ryan v. Dow Chemical Co.,'30 a set of plaintiffs who manifested
their injuries only after the 1984 settlement tried to argue that the
original plaintiff class and its named representative did not adequately
represent their interests.' Specifically, the Ryan plaintiffs insisted
that, since there was no distinct subclass of asymptomatic plaintiffs at
the time of the settlement, the settlement could not bind them.
132
The trial court did not accept this proposition because these
plaintiffs, regardless of their manifestation date, were "eligible for
compensation from the Agent Orange Payment Fund.' 1 33 On appeal,
1995) (discussing in detail the longer lasting settlement provision called the Agent
Orange Class Assistance Program).
129. Importantly, the Agent Orange Payment Program provided no funds for
veterans who manifested their injuries after the depletion of those settlement funds in
1994. See Schuck, supra note 2, at 220. Thus, although the settlement in 1984
purported to bind future injury plaintiffs, the court effectively capped its own
definition of "future injury" by only providing for those plaintiffs who would manifest
injuries within the next ten years. See id. That capping at ten years effectively created
two distinct subsets of future injury plaintiffs in the Agent Orange context: those who
were asymptomatic at the time of the settlement, and those who were asymptomatic
until after the settlement funds ran out. Whereas the court provided for the former
subset in the settlement (provided those futures did manifest within ten years of the
settlement), it neglected to consider that latter group of futures that only manifested
their injuries after 1994. See id. Thus, the latter subset constitutes a subclass of future
injury plaintiffs that were not able to adequately represent their interests at the time
of the settlement. See infra notes 140-41 (explaining how Isaacson and Stephenson
could not adequately represent their interests). In 2001, the Second Circuit's decision
seemingly supported the attorney for Isaacson and Stephenson's theory that this latter
subset was a "no compensation group." See Gerson H. Smoger, Knocking Down
Windmills, Trial, July 2003, at 52, 61 (establishing the term "no compensation group"
for Vietnam veterans who manifested their injuries for the first time after 1994).
Gerson H. Smoger is the attorney who represented Isaacson and Stephenson. See also
infra notes 138-41 and accompanying text (describing the 2001 Second Circuit's
decision that Stephenson and Isaacson represent a subset of futures, manifesting
injuries after 1994, that could not be adequately represented in the same class as
current injury plaintiffs). Smoger recalled in Trial magazine his response to the
Second Circuit's decision in 2001:
Eighteen years after the Agent Orange class action was settled, Vietnam
veterans finally have hope that they may receive compensation for their
devastating injuries. As for me, I'll never forget a voice-mail I received the
day the Second Circuit issued its opinion: "I suppose if you go after enough
windmills, you can finally knock one down."
Smoger, supra, at 61.
130. 781 F. Supp. 902 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
131. Id. at 918-19 ("At the heart of these lawsuits is plaintiffs' belief that it is unfair
to bind them to the settlement because the latency of their injuries prevented them
from knowing definitively whether or not they were included in the class at the time
of the first deadline for opting out of the Agent Orange class action.").
132. Id. at 912 (describing how the plaintiffs sought damages on behalf of the group
of veterans manifesting injuries after the settlement date).
133. Id. at 919. See also supra note 128 for a discussion of how the Ryan court's
projection of future injury latency periods was inaccurate.
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the Second Circuit affirmed the trial court, since the settlement
structure "cover[ed]" future plaintiffs' injuries.1 4  Although those
plaintiffs were uninjured at the time of the settlement, they had
recourse to settlement funds.'
However, the Second Circuit's limited refusal to recognize the need
for a futures subclass has important implications.136 That decision
implicitly suggested that a subset of futures, at some point in the
future, with no recourse to settlement funds might require a distinct
subclass to adequately represent their interests.3 7  Essentially, the
Second Circuit closed the door on futures subclasses in 1993, but left
itself room to re-open that door at a later date.
134. See Ivy v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 996 F.2d 1425, 1436 (2d Cir. 1993)
("We agree with the district court that designation of a subclass of future claimants
and appointment of a guardian to represent their interests was unnecessary 'because
of the way [the settlement] was structured to cover future claimants."' (citing Ryan,
781 F. Supp. at 919)).
135. See Ivy, 996 F.2d at 1436. The Second Circuit explained that since the
plaintiffs are eligible for compensation, it is effectively a moot point to argue that they
were inadequately represented as a matter of procedure. However, this line of
reasoning begs the question of how the court would treat these plaintiffs if, for
example, the settlement funds had depleted as early as 1985 or 1986. Then, these
plaintiffs would arguably be in the same situation as Stephenson and Isaacson, see
infra notes 138-41, arguing that they only manifested their injuries after the depletion
of settlement funds. Accordingly, they would presumably constitute a distinct
subclass of futures not adequately represented in the suit, therefore, the settlement
would not bind them. Thus, this court's reliance on the fortuitous presence of
settlement funds seemed to avoid the larger procedural questions at hand.
136. See Ivy, 996 F.2d at 1436. The Second Circuit agreed with Judge Weinstein's
disapproval of subclasses that he voiced in a fairness hearing at the trial level:
[T]o appoint another attorney to represent that sub-group would just, in my
opinion, increase the amount of legal fees, which is what all of us want to
keep to a bare minimum. There are lots of arguments and classes and sub-
classes, but if we appoint attorneys and guardians ad litem for everybody
who might have ... somewhat of a conflict of interest, there is hardly going
to be any money left for the veteran.
Id. By espousing that opinion, the Second Circuit made practicality and transaction
costs trump the procedural necessity of subclasses. Significantly, the court's decision
not to require subclasses in this case still brings up the possibility that they could be
necessary down the road.
137. The Second Circuit's emphasis that these plaintiffs need not have their own
distinct subclass, since the settlement took care of their needs, invariably leads to the
conclusion that they would deserve their own subclass if the settlement had not taken
care of their needs. See Ivy, 996 F.2d at 1436. However, it appears that at the trial
level, Judge Weinstein found that the benefits of capping the defendant's liability
were more important than answering the harder procedural questions. See Ryan, 781
F. Supp. at 919-20 ("Class action settlements simply will not occur if the parties
cannot set definitive limits on defendants' liability."). Judge Weinstein also suggested
that "[m]aking settlement of Rule 23 suits too difficult will work harms upon
plaintiffs, defendants, the courts, and the general public." Id.
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ii. The Second Circuit: Recent Findings
In 1993, the Second Circuit suggested that a group of Vietnam
veterans manifesting injury after 1994 would require a subclass. It
recently tackled this very problem. In 2001, the Second Circuit
examined the claims of Isaacson and Stephenson after the trial court's
decision to bar their claims.13  The Second Circuit decided that this
case illustrated the type of cognizable intra-class conflict that the
Supreme Court found preclusive of adequate representation
requirements. 139  Thus, the court found that the plaintiff class
consisting of those eligible for funds did not adequately represent
Isaacson and Stephenson's interests. 140  The Second Circuit,
accordingly, suggested that those veterans manifesting injuries after
1994 could sue despite the 1984 settlement.14'
Other circuits have, in turn, suggested that the lack of a futures
subclass at class certification could permit futures to collaterally attack
past judgments.142 Although res judicata normally applies to absent
138. See Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding that
futures manifesting injuries after 1994 were not bound by the 1984 settlement).
139. Id. at 260-61. The Second Circuit elaborated that:
However, they both learned of their allegedly Agent Orange-related injuries
only after the 1984 settlement fund had expired in 1994. Because the prior
litigation purported to settle all future claims, but only provided for recovery
for those whose death or disability was discovered prior to 1994, the conflict
between Stephenson and Isaacson and the class representatives becomes
apparent. No provision was made for post-1994 claimants, and the
settlement fund was permitted to terminate in 1994.
Id.
140. Id. at 261 ("Because these plaintiffs were inadequately represented in the
prior litigation, they were not proper parties and cannot be bound by the
settlement.").
141. See id. at 258 ("[Pllaintiffs' suit can go forward because there has been no
prior adequacy of representation determination with respect to individuals whose
claims arise after the depletion of the settlement fund."); see also Jennifer L. Reichert,
Second Circuit Allows New Agent Orange Suit Despite Class Settlement, Trial, Feb.
2002, at 91 (explaining that the Second Circuit espoused the Supreme Court's
teachings in Amchem and Ortiz that, "if plaintiffs were not proper parties to a
judgment, res judicata could not defeat their claims"); supra note 110 (explaining the
distinct form of collateral attack the Second Circuit advocated in its opinion, allowing
the plaintiffs to proceed with their claims because no requisite adequacy of
representation findings were made in 1984 as to them). But see Epstein v. MCA, Inc.,
179 F.3d 641, 648 (9th Cir. 1999) (proposing that "due process does not require
collateral second-guessing" of a rendering court's procedural determinations); infra
notes 204-08 and accompanying text. The Stephenson court countered the Epstein
court's concerns by emphasizing that the rendering court for the veterans never made
any procedural determinations at all for the group of plaintiffs manifesting injuries
after 1994. See Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 258 n.6 ("Here, neither the district court nor
this Court has determined the adequacy of representation with respect to these
plaintiffs whose injuries did not arise until after the settlement expired.").
142. See infra notes 147-63 and accompanying text (explaining the circuits that have
upheld collateral attack when intra-class divisions occur after the adequacy of
representation finding that subsequently violate some plaintiffs' due process rights).
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class members, 143 it does not apply when the class representative has
not adequately represented the absentee's interests.' 44 It is unclear
whether a current injury class representative could adequately
represent the futures' interests at any point during litigation. 45
Accordingly, long-latency futures without a distinct subclass might be
able to collaterally attack a judgment if they shared an overly inclusive
plaintiff class. 14
6
iii. The Fifth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits
In Gonzales v. Cassidy,147 the Fifth Circuit set forth a two-prong
analysis for determining whether a plaintiff could collaterally attack a
judgment. 14  This analysis recognized that conditions often change
between a court's initial determination of adequacy of representation
and a subsequent collateral attack. 149 The representative's actions as
143. See supra note 51 (explaining the definition of an absent class member).
144. See, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940) ("It is familiar doctrine of
the federal courts that members of a class not present as parties to the litigation may
be bound by the judgment where they are in fact adequately represented by parties
who are present .... ).
145. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 16, Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 123 S.
Ct. 2161 (2003) (No. 02-271) ("In Agent Orange, the class representatives failed to
protect Respondents' needs from the day they were appointed through the day the
settlement funds were exhausted.").
146. Cf. Issacharoff, supra note 24, at 373 (suggesting that collateral attack to a
settlement is a "poor substitute for good governance of class actions ex ante"). Thus,
Issacharoff suggests that strong protections for future claimants in a settlement would
obviate the need for a later collateral attack, permitting the doctrine of res judicata to
control. See id. However, Issacharoff does concede that such protection for futures,
such as appointing a "guardian[] ad litem" is most likely not a "meaningful
protection[] for absent class members in the majority of cases." Id. at 373-74.
147. 474 F.2d 67, 75 (5th Cir. 1973) (finding that a class representative no longer
adequately represented the rest of the class when he failed to appeal a judgment that
was unfavorable to certain members of the class).
148. See id. at 72 (discussing how adequacy of representation requires a two-prong
examination upon collateral attack). The court specifies:
To answer the question whether the class representative adequately
represented the class so that the judgment in the class suit will bind the
absent members of the class requires a two-pronged inquiry: (1) Did the
trial court in the first suit correctly determine, initially, that the
representative would adequately represent the class? and (2) Does it
appear, after the termination of the suit, that the class representative
adequately protected the interest of the class?
Id. Thus, the Gonzales court proposes an initial review of the trial court's
"determination to permit the suit to proceed as a class action" with the stated
representative, then reviews the "class representative's conduct [in] the entire suit."
Id.
149. Id. (explaining that the suggested second prong of inquiry is only "appropriate
in a collateral attack on the judgment" and "not required to be made by the trial
court"); see also id. at 74 (highlighting that a "court conducting the action cannot
predetermine the res judicata effect of the judgment; this can be tested only in [a]
subsequent action" (citing Restatement of Judgments § 86, cmt. (h) (1942) (internal
citation omitted))).
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well as external occurrences 5 ° may turn an initially appropriate
representative into an inappropriate choice. 1' Accordingly, the Fifth
Circuit suggested that courts should consider adequacy of
representation from a prospective and retrospective examination.
5 2
Other circuits have followed the logic behind the Fifth Circuit's
two-prong inquiry. For example, in Williams v. General Electric
Capital Auto Lease, Inc.,"' the Seventh Circuit emphasized the
importance of collateral attack for absent class members.'54
Importantly, the Seventh Circuit permitted an absent class member to
use intra-class conflicts that developed in the course of a case to
collaterally attack a judgment.'55  Thus, the Seventh Circuit's
150. See, e.g., Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 258 (2d Cir. 2001)
(explaining that for the futures manifesting injury after the settlement ran out of
money, "there has been no prior adequacy of representation determination with
respect to [those] individuals"). Although the Second Circuit adopted a very specific
form of collateral attack for its plaintiffs, see supra note 110, the depletion of the
Agent Orange Payment Program after 1994 exemplifies the type of changing
conditions the Fifth Circuit contemplated. See Gonzales, 474 F.2d at 72.
151. See, e.g., Gonzales, 474 F.2d at 73 ("The second question is whether [the
representative's] conduct of the entire suit was such that due process would not be
violated by giving res judicata effect to the judgment in that suit."). The Fifth Circuit
specifies that at this stage in the inquiry, the "question necessarily requires a hindsight
approach to the issue" and "in no way reflects" the validity of the trial court's
conclusions. Id. at n.11 (emphasis added).
152. Upon collateral attack, a second court would have to examine the first court's
determination in light of the earlier conditions present at that time. See supra note 25
(defining collateral attack). Then, the second court would have to adopt a current
perspective and examine the propriety of the first court's determination in light of the
new, current day context. See Gonzales, 474 F.2d at 75 (explaining that during the
second inquiry, "[f]actors which were not brought to the attention of the first court-
including, most centrally, the adequacy of representation in the first suit-may lead to
a changed perspective." (quoting M. Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations
Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39, 46 (1967) (internal citation omitted))).
Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit's approach resonates with the fundamentals the Court
laid forth in the important Hansberry decision. See id. at 74 ("Due process of law
would be violated for the judgment in a class suit to be res judicata to the absent
members of a class unless the court applying res judicata can conclude that the class
was adequately represented in the first suit." (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 61
(1942))).
153. 159 F.3d 266 (7th Cir. 1998) (granting the defendant car leasing company an
injunction against other suits after they had already settled a class action). In this
case, the plaintiffs were unable to collaterally attack the settlement because Judge
Wood found that they were not truly unnamed plaintiff class members since they had
sufficient notice about the settlement. Id. at 275. However, notwithstanding the fact
that these plaintiffs had notice and a chance to represent their rights before the
settlement, Judge Wood's explanations of the propriety of collateral attack have
important and far-reaching applications beyond the instant case.
154. Although this case revolves around a class action that is not in the mass tort
context, the theories underlying adequacy of representation, due process of the law,
and collateral attack remain the same.
155. Id. at 269-70 (explaining that "in the light of the fully developed record," there
is often the possibility that intra-class conflicts arose and rendered an absentee's
representation "inadequate"). This concept has undeniable importance in the Ivy
case as well as long-latency torts as a whole. For example, in light of the "fully
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recognition that intra-class conflicts may develop and alter adequacy
of representation suggests it has adopted the logic underlying the Fifth
Circuit's two-prong inquiry.'56
Also, the Eleventh Circuit has held that absent class members
require special attention in the context of a collateral attack.157 In
Twigg v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,158 the plaintiff claimed that the class
action settlement was not binding upon him because his cause of
action was different from the rest of the class.159 The court examined
the entire course of the litigation and found that Twigg did not receive
sufficient notice, thereby qualifying him as an absent class member. 160
Accordingly, the court provided that such an absentee may
"collaterally attack the prior judgment on the ground that to apply
claim preclusion would deny him due process. ' 161 Thus, the Eleventh
Circuit recognized that after a class settlement, different
circumstances in light of a "fully developed record''162 might prove
developed" course of events of the Agent Orange Payment Program and its
depletion, claimants who manifested injuries after 1994 presumably have an intra-
class conflict with those who manifested their injuries when funds were available. See
supra notes 134-37 (explaining how the Ivy court suggests certain futures would not
be eligible for settlement funds and therefore may require a distinct subclass).
Following the Seventh Circuit's rationale, those future plaintiffs could
collaterally attack such a judgment that did not respond to the intra-class conflicts
which arose, "in light of the fully developed record." Williams, 159 F.3d at 269-70. In
2001, the Second Circuit permitted those post-1994 futures to sue on the theory that
they were never even proper parties; the Seventh Circuit's intra-class conflict logic
suggests that, even if the Second Circuit had not used that theory, those futures would
still be able to collaterally attack the settlement. See supra note 110 (describing the
narrow and broad uses of collateral attack that the Second Circuit highlighted in its
recent dealings with claims of Vietnam veterans who manifested injuries after 1994).
156. See supra notes 147-52 and accompanying text (outlining the Fifth Circuit's
two-prong standard of review).
157. See Twigg v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 153 F.3d 1222 (11th Cir. 1998) (finding
that a class action judgment is not binding upon an absent plaintiff that received
insufficient notice). Although this case is about fraud charges against Sears for
servicing new tires on cars, it clarifies principles of due process for absent class
members generally.
158. See id.
159. Id. at 1226 ("Twigg contends that he is not a member of the settlement class
and that his claims are not identical to those raised in the 1992 National Class Action,
and therefore that the earlier action cannot bar his suit."). Twigg argued, therefore,
that "barring his claims would deny him due process" because he did not receive
sufficient notice. Id. Sears countered this suggestion by arguing that Twigg was
indeed a member of the settlement class because his claim arose "'out of the same
operative nucleus of fact"' as the others, thereby rendering claim preclusion
appropriate. See id. at 1225 (quoting Manning v. City of Auburn, 953 F.2d 1355, 1358
(11th Cir. 1992)).
160. Id. at 1227 ("[W]e conclude that even if Twigg had received the notices, their
language was insufficient to notify him that claims like his were being litigated in the
action."); see also supra note 51 and accompanying text (defining an absent class
member).
161. Twigg, 153 F.3d at 1226 (citations omitted).
162. Williams v. Gen. Elec. Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 159 F.3d 266, 269-70 (7th Cir.
1998).
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that, in hindsight, the settlement violates a plaintiff's due process
rights.'63
As this section demonstrates, courts have grappled with the
questions of (1) whether to use futures subclasses, (2) which futures
truly belong in a subclass, and (3) when futures may collaterally attack
a judgment that lacked those subclasses. However, the Supreme
Court, while acknowledging the uncertainty in this area, has yet to
resolve these questions definitively.
c. The Supreme Court's Treatment of the Subclass Cure
In 1997, in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, the Supreme Court
suggested a solution to the futures problem within its invalidation of a
plaintiff class including future and current injury plaintiffs.' 64 It is
possible to infer from the Court's language that futures do not belong
in a class with current injury plaintiffs. The Court's decision two years
later in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.165 reinforced the Court's belief that
futures do belong in a distinct subclass. However, the practicality and
legality of that solution remain unclear. In 2003, in Dow Chemical Co.
v. Stephenson, the Court handed down a very ambiguous decision that
seemingly supports the subclass solution, but again did not resolve the
attendant questions. 166
i. Amchem Products, Inc., v. Windsor
Justice Ginsburg issued the Court's opinion when the Georgine
asbestos settlement reached the Court in 1997.167 Just as Justice
Ginsburg deferred to the Third Circuit's discussion of notice
requirements, 16' so too did she defer to the Third Circuit's findings
regarding the adequacy of the class representation. 6 9 Specifically,
163. See Twigg, 153 F.3d at 1226. Although the Eleventh Circuit did not explicitly
base its review upon the hindsight approach that the Fifth and Seventh Circuit
espoused, its analysis of Twigg's notice and whether he was an absent class member
effectively accomplishes the same prospective and retrospective inquiry.
164. See Amchem Prods., Inc., v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). For a
comprehensive discussion of the Amchem case and its repercussions, see S. Charles
Neill, Comment, The Tower of Babel Revisited: The U.S. Supreme Court Decertifies
One of the Largest Mass Tort Classes in History, 37 Washburn L.J. 793, 826-27 (1998),
which concludes that "[h]owever, unlike the Tower of Babel, class actions have not
been destroyed. The Amchem Court has merely ordered the tower be built on a
fortified foundation." Id.
165. 527 U.S. 815, 856-57 (1999) (decertifying an asbestos settlement-only class in
the context of a limited fund class action).
166. See Dow Chem. Co., v. Stephenson, 123 S. Ct. 2161 (2003).
167. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 591.
168. See infra note 224 and accompanying text (explaining the Amchem Court's
reliance on the Third Circuit's notice findings).
169. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 627-28 ("The Third Circuit found no assurance
here-either in the terms of the settlement or in the structure of the negotiations-
that the named plaintiffs operated under a proper understanding of their
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Justice Ginsburg espoused the Third Circuit's logic that it is more
appropriate for named plaintiffs with different medical conditions to
represent a "discrete subclass[]" as opposed to a "single giant class.' 170
Thus, the Court found that present and future injury plaintiffs' legal
interests are too disparate to share the protections of the same
plaintiff class.' 71 The Amchem Court used the differences between
present and future injury plaintiffs as illustrative of the most
fundamental "rift"'172 within a plaintiff class that precludes either
group from adequately representing their interests. However, the
Court did not extend its discussion to address whether a collateral
attack would be appropriate for improperly bound futures. 173
representational responsibilities." (citation omitted)). Justice Ginsburg concluded
that the Third Circuit's assessment was "on the mark." Id.
170. Id. at 626 (explaining that the interests between plaintiffs with different
illnesses are not aligned and should therefore not be lumped together into one large
class). Furthermore, the Court explained that even though the chemical company
could pay for a settlement of all these different medical claims, that does not justify
combining presently injured and exposure-only plaintiffs in one class. Id.
171. See id; see also Patrick Woolley, The Availability of Collateral Attack for
Inadequate Representation in Class Suits, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 383, 433 (2000) (explaining
how it is often difficult for courts to determine the "line between substantial and
insubstantial divergences between class members" but finding that in Amchem, those
"divergences" were "sufficiently substantial to require separate representation").
Woolley also suggests that finding inadequate representation would make a judge's
management of the suit infinitely more difficult, and indeed might even render judges
"unduly biased toward finding that a class member has been adequately represented."
Id. at 434.
172. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (citing the Georgine court's logic
that differing interests between present and future injury plaintiffs create
insurmountable intra-class conflicts); see also Mark C. Weber, A Consent-Based
Approach to Class Action Settlement: Improving Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,
59 Ohio St. L.J. 1155, 1175 (1998) (discussing that the currently "injured have large,
immediate payments as their overriding goal, while exposure-only claimants have a
conflicting interest in an ample fund to compensate future injuries, one that will be
protected from potential inflation"); cf Weinstein, supra note 3, at 66 ("As we have
learned in the Manville Trust litigation, the more subclasses created, the more severe
conflicts bubble to the surface and inhibit settlement."). Judge Weinstein concludes
his discussion of the potential costs of distinct subgroups by suggesting that courts
strive to achieve an "appropriate balance between allowing the various voices within
the community to be heard and compromising disputes in a way that provides
relatively prompt succor to the injured. The resources of defendants and, ultimately,
the community must not be exhausted by protracted litigation." Id. Judge
Weinstein's insights represent a "communitarian ethic" that he believes should
underlie the equitable resolution of mass tort cases. Id. at 65.
173. Cf Graham C. Lilly, Modeling Class Actions: The Representative Suit as an
Analytic Tool, 81 Neb. L. Rev. 1008, 1037-38 (2003) (explaining the Supreme Court's
finding of inadequate representation in Hansberry "thus supports the principle that a
post-judgment attack on the adequacy of representation, even if not ideal, is a
constitutionally mandated means of securing the due process rights of class
absentees"). No commentators have suggested that the Court's decision in Amchem
stands for such a proposition. See Issacharoff, supra note 24, at 372 (explaining that
the Supreme Court has defended the propriety of collateral attack for non-class
members, but has yet to do so formally for "absent class members" claiming to be
"nonparties to the original litigation"). Importantly, Issacharoff wrote that article in
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ii. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.
In 1999, the Supreme Court applied its rationale from Amchem in
the context of a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) limited fund class action. 74 Finding
that this case did not fit into the true meaning of a limited fund, 75 the
Court cited Amchem's teachings about futures subclasses and
adequacy of representation. 7 6  Specifically, Justice Souter declared
that holders of present and future injury claims require separate,
"homogenous subclasses under Rule 23(c)(4)(B).' '1 77
Because the district court had failed to do so, the present and future
injury plaintiffs could not share a representative to adequately
represent the futures' interests under Rule 23(a)(4).17 s Additionally,
provisions in the settlement giving equal allocation of funds to all
plaintiffs did not cure the class certification defect of combining
present and future injury claims in one plaintiff class.'79
1999, very soon after Amchem and Ortiz; it is highly probable that those are the cases
to which he was subtly referring. Thus, the fact that different circuits have
contemplated the propriety of collateral attacks for futures and the Supreme Court
has not shed any light on that line of debate only perpetuates the confusion
surrounding the futures problem.
174. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999); see also supra note 67
(describing a limited fund class action). While the district court and Fifth Circuit
found that the defendant had a $235 million limited fund, "[t]he same, however,
cannot be said for the value of the disputed insurance." Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 851. The
Court criticized the trial court's finding that there was a limited fund in the first place
because there were no factual findings that the insurance assets had an "upper limit"
necessary to secure limited fund treatment. Id. The Court specified that "[i]nstead of
undertaking an independent evaluation of potential insurance funds, the District
Court (and, later, the Court of Appeals), simply accepted the $2 billion Trilateral
Settlement Agreement figure as representing the maximum amount the insurance
companies could be required to pay tort victims." Id.
175. Id. at 848 ("[The district court] failed to demonstrate that the fund was limited
except by the agreement of the parties, and it showed exclusions from the class and
allocations of assets at odds with the concept of limited fund treatment and the
structural protections of Rule 23(a) explained in Amchem.").
176. See id. at 856-57 (highlighting that Amchem's requirements for adequacy of
representation were necessary for a limited fund class action, although the Ortiz case
did not even qualify as a true limited fund).
177. Id. at 856. Thus, while Amchem suggested the subclass cure by stating that
future and present injury plaintiffs could not share a plaintiff class, the Ortiz Court
reinforced the necessity of separate subclasses for future injury plaintiffs.
178. Id. at 856-57. See also supra notes 21-35 and accompanying text for an
explanation of the requirements of Rule 23(a)(4) adequacy of representation.
179. See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 857 (explaining that the Fifth Circuit's logic to ignore
intra-class conflicts because of equal allocation of resources "as between the
conflicting classes" is faulty). The Court specified that "[t]he very decision to treat
them all the same is itself an allocation decision with results almost certainly different
from the results that those with immediate injuries or claims of indemnified liability
would have chosen." Id.
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iii. Agent Orange: The Dow Decision
In 2003, six years after Amchem and four years after Ortiz, the
Court had the opportunity to revisit its understanding of Rule
23(a)(4)'s adequacy of representation requirements in the context of
Agent Orange in Dow Chemical Co. v. Stephenson. s° Although the
Supreme Court's Amchem decision in 1997 had shifted the legal
landscape for asbestos victims, it remained unclear how subsequent
Supreme Court decisions would treat the Amchem opinion in the
context of other mass torts. The Dow Court affirmed the Second
Circuit in a 4-4 decision with no opinion. 8' This most recent future
injury plaintiff mass tort decision neither elaborated nor clarified the
findings of Amchem.
The Court's decision, however, left the Second Circuit's 2001
opinion as the current state of the law. 82 In 2001, the Second Circuit
decided that the 1984 settlement was not binding for veterans who
manifested injuries after the depletion of the settlement funds.8 3 The
Second Circuit drew much of its reasoning from "the Supreme Court's
teaching in Amchem and Ortiz."'" The Second Circuit's
interpretation of Amchem and Ortiz is thus the precedent that the
Dow Court selected to control this issue.' Accordingly, the Dow
Court supported the Second Circuit's rationale'86 that long-latency
180. 123 S. Ct. 2161 (2003).
181. See id. at 2161-62. Justice John Paul Stevens recused himself from this case.
See Supreme Court Allows Veterans to Sue for Agent Orange Exposure, Andrews
Class Action Litig. Rep., July 2003, at 8. Justice Stevens' son, John Joseph, served in
Vietnam and died of cancer when he was 47 years old, in 1996. See Charles Lane,
Supreme Court Allows Agent Orange Suit, Wash. Post, June 10, 2003, at A6 (noting
that Justice Stevens "gave no reason for his recusal").
182. Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2001). See also supra
notes 138-41 and accompanying text for more discussion of the Second Circuit's
findings.
183. See Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 261 ("For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the
prior Agent Orange settlement does not preclude these plaintiffs from asserting their
claims alleging injury due to Agent Orange exposure."). The Second Circuit was
referring to plaintiffs who had not manifested any injuries prior to the depletion of
the settlement funds, and thus had no legal redress for their grievances. See id.
184. Id.
185. This proposition presupposes that the Dow Court agreed with the entirety of
the Second Circuit's rationale surrounding the status of future injury plaintiffs,
because the Dow Court would have presumably reversed in part any pertinent section
of the Second Circuit's decision with which it disagreed.
186. See Dow, 123 S. Ct. at 2161-62 ("With respect to respondents Daniel
Raymond Stephenson ... the judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court."). In
the Agent Orange context, 1994 was the date that divided those futures eligible for
compensation and those who were not. See supra note 141 and accompanying text
(describing the Second Circuit's findings about veteran eligibility). In that context,
long-latency is thefunctional equivalent of post-1994 injury manifestation. However,
for asbestos and other toxins, no such global date exists because of the complexity of
different bankruptcy trusts and other compensation schemes. See supra note 125
(explaining how the same long-latency theories apply in both the Agent Orange and
asbestos contexts).
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future injury plaintiffs cannot be in the same plaintiff class as the
currently injured and require their own subclass.187
2. Future Injury Plaintiffs Should Not Occupy Their Own Subclass
Although certain courts have suggested that future injury plaintiffs
require a distinct subclass from current injury plaintiffs to adequately
represent their rights, 8 8 futures subclasses may not be a sufficient
solution to manage long-latency future injury plaintiffs. First,
different circuit courts have found that a subclass of absent members
cannot retroactively collaterally attack past judgments.189  Second,
once a distinct futures subclass passes the hurdle of adequate
representation, many courts and commentators have suggested that
the requirement of providing notice to such a subclass still remains a
Therefore in those contexts, long-latency future injury plaintiffs include
anyone who has been exposed to a toxin and has yet to manifest an injury. See supra
note 125. Presumably, such a group will always require special protections in light of
competing current injury claims. See supra note 125 (explaining how all holders of
future claims invariably have competing interests in class actions). Importantly, some
courts provide special provisions, such as medical monitoring, for those long latency
plaintiffs who are aware of their exposure. See, e.g., Hazard, supra note 9, at 1905
(explaining that if there is a "reasonable suspicion" that exposure-aware plaintiffs will
fall ill, the courts can order "periodic examinations" to determine when they become
sick and subsequently eligible for recovery). As such, Hazard likens future plaintiffs
participating in medical monitoring as "similar to a set of present claimants in respects
critical to administration of mass torts justice." Id. at 1906. Also, Judge Weinstein
characterizes medical monitoring as a "promising" theory since it creates "sustained
studies of exposed populations" and "provide[s] early diagnosis and treatment" when
the participants do manifest an illness. Weinstein, supra note 3, at 154. For a more
complete discussion of medical monitoring, see Pankaj Venugopal, The Class
Certification of Medical Monitoring Claims, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 1659 (2002), arguing
that courts should certify claims solely for medical monitoring as mandatory Rule
23(b)(2) class actions.
187. See Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 261 (analyzing Amchem and Ortiz to find that
"Stephenson and Isaacson were not adequately represented in the prior Agent
Orange litigation."). The Second Circuit also noted that "the conflict between
Stephenson and Isaacson and the class representatives becomes apparent" since they
did not manifest injury until after 1994; accordingly, they "were inadequately
represented in the prior litigation.... were not proper parties and cannot be bound
by the settlement." Id. at 260-61.
That reasoning, coupled with the Second Circuit's reference to the Court's
mandate in Ortiz to divide a class "between holders of present and future claims...
into homogenous subclasses under Rule 23(c)(4)(B)" strongly suggests that
Stephenson and Isaacson belonged in a futures subclass. Id. at 260 (citing Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 856 (1999)); see also supra note 110 (explaining how
the Second Circuit took a narrow approach to the collateral attack doctrine by finding
the veterans were not parties in the first place and could proceed with their suits
despite the 1984 settlement); cf. supra notes 147-63 (explaining how other circuits
would presumably allow a collateral attack by the veterans manifesting injury post-
1994, even if they were proper parties in the first place).
188. See, e.g., Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 856; Amchem Prods., Inc., v. Windsor, 521 U.S.
591, 626 (1997).
189. See generally Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 179 F.3d 641, 648 (9th Cir. 1999);
Nottingham Partners v. Trans-Lux Corp., 925 F.2d 29, 32-33 (1st Cir. 1991).
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significant problem.190 If a party is unable to give notice to a subclass
of people not cognizant of their injuries, the subclass cure for
adequate representation may, in fact, be meaningless.
a. A Subclass of Future Injury Plaintiffs May Not Collaterally Attack
Past Judgments
The First, Third and Ninth Circuits have all found that collateral
attack is an inappropriate tool for absent class members to avoid a
binding judgment. As a result, futures may only appeal a previous
court's decision through direct appeal, not through a collateral attack.
i. The First Circuit
In Nottingham Partners v. Trans-Lux Corp.,19 the First Circuit
found that an absent class member cannot attack a binding settlement
if the rendering court utilized "acceptable procedural safeguards."1"
Although the plaintiff was unhappy with the settlement and
retrospectively wished the courts had permitted him to opt out,193 the
First Circuit found no flaw in the initial court's certification
190. See, e.g., Weber, supra note 172, at 1159 (explaining that people who do not
know they are sick have no reason to pay attention to any class action notice).
191. 925 F.2d at 29 (concluding that release in a shareholders' class action
settlement collaterally estopped those class members from litigating those issues again
in federal court). Although this case revolved around issue preclusion more so than
claim preclusion, the court addressed the plaintiff's arguments about claim preclusion
and adequacy of representation anyway, before ultimately deciding that those claims
lacked merit:
Unhappy with the district court's map of the case's topography, appellants
strive mightily to transmogrify this appeal into an exploration of res judicata
(claim preclusion) rather than release and issue preclusion. Their
expedition, we suggest, is misguided .... Since further prosecution of
appellants' federal suit is foreclosed by the release defense.., it would be
pointless to discuss at any length whether their action is also claim-
precluded.
Id. at 32 (internal cross-reference omitted).
192. Id. at 33; cf. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42 (1940) (suggesting that "this
Court is justified in saying that there has been a failure of due process only in those
cases where it cannot be said that the procedure adopted, fairly insures the protection
of the interests of absent parties who are to be bound by it."(citation omitted)).
193. See Nottingham Partners, 925 F.2d at 32 (explaining how this case revolved
around a Rule 23(b)(2) class action where a court determines that an objecting "party
will not be allowed to opt out" of the class). As opposed to Rule 23(b)(3) class
actions, which afford plaintiffs notice and the opportunity to opt-out, Rule 23(b)(2)
class actions are mandatory and do not provide plaintiffs an opportunity to opt out.
Generally, those suits are used for injunctive, equitable relief for a given class. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) ("[T]he party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.").
Because, in Nottingham Partners, the defendants were trying to enjoin the
shareholder class from relitigating their claims, a 23(b)(2) class was appropriate. See
925 F.2d at 32.
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decisions.194 Following this ruling, collateral attack was inappropriate
and the court affirmed that the settlement was indeed binding upon
the plaintiff.195  According to this reasoning, the Ryan and Ivy
courts, 9 6 unaware that Agent Orange futures would be situated
differently after 1994, would be immune from collateral attack as
employing "acceptable procedural safeguards" at the time of their
decisions.1
97
ii. The Third Circuit
In Grimes v. Vitalink Communications Corp.,'98 the Third Circuit
recognized that absent class members must have some recourse if they
find a settlement unfair. However, the Third Circuit emphasized that
such recourse is usually an appeal, as opposed to a collateral attack. 99
Since the plaintiffs in this case appealed their unfavorable decision to
the highest Delaware court and then to the Supreme Court, the Third
Circuit decided that the plaintiff and "the other class members had
been granted all the process that was due. 2 0 This case suggests that a
futures subclass must suffer the hardship of a seemingly unfair
settlement, since those plaintiffs missed the window of opportunities
that due process affords.201
194. See Nottingham Partners, 925 F.2d at 32 ("Appellants received notice ....
They were given, and vigorously exercised, a constitutionally adequate opportunity to
be heard.").
195. See id.
196. See supra notes 130-37 and accompanying text (explaining how the Ryan and
Ivy courts discussed futures but presumably did not provide relief for long-latency for
futures).
197. Nottingham Partners, 925 F.2d at 33. This proposition begs the question
underlying this entire Note; whether a futures subclass, at the time of certification, is a
necessary "procedural safeguard[]." Id. If the First Circuit did view a futures subclass
as an important "safeguard[]," then the court would presumably permit a collateral
attack by long-latency futures who did not have such a subclass. However, if the
futures subclass is not a necessary "procedural safeguard[]," then the First Circuit
would presumably forbid a collateral attack by futures. See id. Alternatively, there is
always the chance that other circuits could adopt the Second Circuit's reasoning that
such futures may perform a narrow collateral attack, trying to litigate in the first
instance, if they were never proper parties to the class. See supra note 110 (explaining
the Second Circuit's nuanced use of the collateral attack doctrine).
198. 17 F.3d 1553 (3d Cir. 1994) (affirming a state court release of plaintiff
shareholders' claims in favor of the defendant).
199. See id. at 1558 (explaining that objecting plaintiffs have the "opportunity to
address the court as to the reasons the proposed settlement is unfair or inadequate"
and stating that "federal plaintiffs pursuing this case on appeal were provided with
such an opportunity in the state court litigation").
200. Id. It is critical to note that for long latency future injury plaintiffs, it may
seem impossible to appeal an unfair decision, since a future is by definition healthy
during the court proceedings. However, an exposure-aware plaintiff might be able to
appeal. See infra note 217 and accompanying text (explaining the difference between
asymptomatic plaintiffs who are aware and those unaware of their exposure to a
toxin).
201. See id. at 1558. While it is unclear whether the Third Circuit would extend its
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When the Third Circuit did examine the futures problem in
Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc.,202 it held that present and future
injury claimants could not share a plaintiff class,2°3 but did not discuss
whether it would permit a collateral attack by a futures subclass. The
Third Circuit, therefore, contributes to the confusion surrounding a
futures subclass' right to collaterally attack a judgment that
improperly combined future and present injury plaintiffs.
iii. The Ninth Circuit
In 1999, the Ninth Circuit handed down a decision that denied a
collateral review of a class action adequacy determination. 204  It
emphasized that as long as a trial court follows the certifying
requirements laid forth in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts then
Shutts by no means guarantees plaintiffs a collateral attack.2 6
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit rested an absent class plaintiff's rights
on the conduct and procedures of the certifying court as opposed to
the potential fruits of a collateral attack. 27 Like the First Circuit, the
rationale to future injury plaintiffs, it nevertheless expressed a potential policy
concern that after an appropriate period for appeals, the defendant should have some
repose. Also, it is possible that such a hardship could fall primarily upon exposure-
unaware future injury plaintiffs, and would be less of a concern for the exposure-
aware. See infra note 217 and accompanying text (explaining the differences between
long-latency plaintiffs aware and unaware of their exposure to a toxin).
202. 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996); see also supra notes 112-19 and accompanying text
(describing the Third Circuit's finding that future injury plaintiffs cannot share a
plaintiff class with the currently injured because the two groups have different
interests).
203. See Georgine, 83 F.3d at 630 (finding that a plaintiff class combining present
and future injury plaintiffs did not meet Rule 23(a)(4)'s adequacy of representation
requirement).
204. See Epstein v. MCA Inc., 179 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that a
Delaware state court securities law judgment precluded a federal suit based on the
Full Faith and Credit Act). In this case, while plaintiffs were appealing the trial
court's decision, the Delaware Chancery Court approved a class action settlement
which released all federal claims. The appellants in Epstein were members of both
the state and federal plaintiff class at the time and therefore claimed that this turn of
events violated their due process and inadequately represented their interests. See id.
at 643.
205. 472 U.S. 797 (1985); see supra note 43 and accompanying text (describing the
Shutts requirements for notice and due process).
206. See Epstein, 179 F.3d at 648 ("Shutts does not support the broad collateral
review that the Epstein appellants seek."); cf. id. at 648 ("Shutts in fact implies that
such review is unwarranted by emphasizing that the certifying court is charged with
protecting the interests of the absent class members." (citing Shutts, 472 U.S. at 809)).
207. See id. ("Simply put, the absent class members' due process right to adequate
representation is protected not by collateral review, but by the certifying court
initially, and thereafter by appeal .... ). The Ninth Circuit cited as support the First
Circuit in Nottingham Partners v. Trans-Lux Corp., 925 F.2d 29, 33 (1991) and the
Third Circuit in Grimes v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 17 F.3d 1553, 1558 (1999).
The Epstein court also quoted the Hansberry Court for the proposition that "there
has been a failure of due process only in those cases where it cannot be said that the
procedure adopted, fairly insures the protection of the interests of absent parties who
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Ninth Circuit would presumably forbid a collateral attack in the
Agent Orange context as improper "collateral second-guessing" of the
1984 certification and settlement decisions.0 8
While these three circuit courts suggest that long-latency futures
may not collaterally attack a settlement, °  other courts have
underlined even more problematic repercussions of a distinct future
injury subclass.
b. Courts Cannot Provide Adequate Notice to a Subclass of Future
Injury Plaintiffs
If a court certifies future injury plaintiffs in a subclass, the
procedural and constitutional notice requirements may still preclude
are to be bound by it." Epstein, 179 F.3d at 648 (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32,
42 (1940) (emphasis added)); see also Brief for Petitioners at 30, Dow Chem. Co. v.
Stephenson, 123 S. Ct. 2161 (2003) (No. 02-271) (explaining how the Epstein court
took adequacy of representation precautions that did not exist at the time of the
Hansberry decision). The petitioners brief specifies that in Hansberry:
The absent class members there received none of the protections accorded
respondents and other unnamed class members under Rule 23: the
Hansberry trial court was under no obligation to, and did not in fact, take
any steps either to ensure the adequacy of the class representation or to
provide notice to absent class members .... Just the opposite is true in suits
proceeding under Rule 23.
Id. at 30 (internal citation omitted). The petitioners also stressed the presumption
that judges are fully capable of making such important decisions about adequacy of
representation and determining the due process rights of claimants. See id. at 29.
208. Epstein, 179 F.3d at 648 (explaining that if the certifying court uses
"appropriate procedures" then due process does not require a collateral attack of
such procedures); see also supra note 197 (explaining the confusion surrounding
whether a futures subclass is a procedural necessity and the implications therein for
the propriety of a collateral attack by futures). Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit's
reasoning leaves opens the possibility that futures who were not proper parties to the
litigation could sue for the first time. See supra note 110 (explaining the Second
Circuit's theory about improper parties' right to sue). Importantly, the Second
Circuit suggested that improper parties could sue even when the Ninth Circuit might
forbid a collateral attack to "second-guess[]" the trial court's determinations.
Epstein, 179 F.3d at 648 (discouraging the use of collateral attack to question
retrospectively the certification court's decisions).
209. These three circuits discuss when absent class members may collaterally attack
a judgment, albeit not in the context of future injury plaintiffs. However, their focus
on respecting a rendering court's decision about adequacy of representation could be
persuasive in the context of futures as well, since it might be unfeasible to expect any
rendering court to anticipate what the future will hold. See supra note 208 and
accompanying text (advocating that subsequent courts should not be able to question
retrospectively an initial court's determinations if the initial court took all the
appropriate procedural steps at that time). Importantly, these cases do not suggest
what type of procedure a rendering court should use to make sure futures are
adequately represented. Therefore, these cases do not shed any light on whether
futures subclasses are the best way to take care of futures' interests. Rather, they
suggest that if the rendering court made its determinations properly and did not place
futures into a subclass, then plaintiffs complaining that they should have been in a
subclass would not be able to collaterally attack the rendering court's decision. See id.
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the viability of the subclass cure.21 ° Several courts have suggested that
any notice to futures may be ineffective; futures who are ignorant of
both their latent injuries and their putative legal claims might not be
capable of making a meaningful decision to stay in the class action or
opt out. 211
i. The Third Circuit's Treatment of Notice
In Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc.,212 the Third Circuit
recognized the problems inherent in providing notice to future injury
plaintiffs, 213 as well as possible arguments defendants could raise that
futures who are identifiable may be better off having courts notify
them about a possible settlement offer.2 14  However, although the
court went out of its way to discuss these problems, it reined in its
discussion at a very critical juncture. Importantly, the Third Circuit
stated that "although we have serious concerns as to the constitutional
210. See supra notes 42-53 (explaining the procedural and constitutional notice
requirements).
211. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (holding
that "due process requires at a minimum that an absent plaintiff be provided with an
opportunity to remove himself from the class by executing and returning an 'opt out'
or 'request for exclusion' form to the court"). Importantly, the Court qualified that
statement with an important exception that resonates loudly for the future plaintiff:
"Our holding today is limited to those class actions which seek to bind known
plaintiffs concerning claims wholly or predominately for money judgments. Id. at 811
n.3 (emphasis added). See also infra note 239 and accompanying text for a discussion
of how unimpaired claimants have little incentive to pay attention to any notice that
may be provided at the outset of a class action.
Additionally, Professor Mark C. Weber has explained that certain people within
a class have "no reason to know of or to be concerned about their potential injuries"
and that there is no way to give those people "meaningful notice" that would permit
them "to make sensible individual decisions whether to accept or reject the
settlement." See Weber, supra note 172, at 1159. Additionally, Judge Diane P. Wood
has suggested that the problem of providing notice to futures has important
repercussions in possible bankruptcy solutions. See Wood, supra note 36, at 1936
(explaining that after bankruptcy proceedings, a "critical prerequisite to a valid
discharge ... is a complete and honest schedule of debts, which is then followed by
constitutionally adequate notice furnished to all creditors"). Thus, if courts cannot
identify potential future creditors to a bankruptcy proceeding, it cannot provide
notice to them, thereby rendering the bankruptcy impossible to realize when
individual creditors do not know who they are. Id; see also infra notes 278-80 and
accompanying text (discussing how a futures subclass solution runs against the grain
of effective bankruptcy proceedings).
212. 83 F.3d 610 (1996).
213. See id. at 622 ("[I]n this futures class action with virtually no delayed opt-out
rights, notice to absent class members cannot meet the requirements of Rule 23 or the
Constitution." (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,
313 (1950))).
214. See id. at 623. The court recited the settling parties' proposition that future
injury class members are in fact in a very powerful position because they have notice,
the "terms of the settlement before them," and are therefore in a better position to
make a choice than plaintiffs who have no idea how their case and settlement will
"come out." Id.
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adequacy of class notice, we decline to reach these issues, and pass on
to the class certification issues. "215
Because the Third Circuit found the certification question
dispositive, 16 it did not need to address the notice problems in its
resolution of the case. 217 The court's decision to touch upon the notice
problem, and subsequently abandon it, left open a window for the
Supreme Court to elaborate upon the issue.218
ii. The Supreme Court's Treatment of Notice
The Supreme Court's leading cases discussing class action
settlements which have purported to bind future injury plaintiffs cast
much doubt upon how a court can uphold notice and adequacy of
representation requirements. The Third Circuit and the Supreme
Court have suggested that future injury plaintiffs need a distinct
subclass in order to meet the adequacy of representation
requirements.219 As long as that requirement of due process has not
been satisfied, the courts have invalidated resulting settlements
without reaching the notice problem. One scholar has characterized
the Court's choice not to deal explicitly with the notice problem as
fraught with "core difficult[ies]. 22 °
215. See id. at 623.
216. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing the Third Circuit's
treatment of adequacy of representation and how the Georgine class did not meet
class certification standards).
217. See Georgine, 83 F.3d at 633 ("Problems in adequately notifying and informing
exposure-only plaintiffs of what is at stake in this class action may be
insurmountable."). Importantly, the Third Circuit distinguished between exposure-
only plaintiffs who were aware and those who were unaware of their exposure. See id.
The court cited as an example, the "spouses of the occupationally exposed" who
might be unaware of their family member's exposure, but still within the terms of the
class action as eligible for some monetary recovery. Id. Next, the court reasoned that
those plaintiffs aware of their exposure might still pay little attention to any class
notice a court could provide, as well as "lack adequate information to properly
evaluate whether to opt out of the settlement." Id. ("Without physical injuries, people
are unlikely to be on notice that they can give up causes of action that have not yet
accrued.").
Finally, the Third Circuit emphasized that "[it is unrealistic to expect every
individual with incidental exposure to asbestos to realize that he or she could
someday contract a deadly disease and make a reasoned decision about whether to
stay in this class action." Id; see also Wood, supra note 36, at 1941 (drawing a similar
distinction as the Third Circuit did between futures who "know who they are today"
and those "who cannot intelligently participate in present litigation for various
reasons"); see infra note 224 and accompanying text (describing Justice Ginsburg's
similar concerns about providing adequate notice).
218. See infra notes 224-27 and accompanying text (showing how Justice Ginsburg
in Amchem chose not to decide the notice issue left unresolved by the Third Circuit).
219. See supra notes 118, 170-72 and accompanying text (discussing the Georgine
court and Amchem Court's position on adequacy of representation).
220. See Issacharoff, supra note 24, at 340. Issacharoff gracefully refers to Amchem
and Ortiz as "identif[ying] rather than fully explain[ing] the potential mischief in the
class action settlements it condemns." Id.
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1. Amchem Products Inc. v. Windsor
After the Third Circuit vacated and remanded the Georgine
settlement class, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1997.221 In
an opinion reflecting a six-justice majority,222 Justice Ginsburg found
that the requirements for class certification were not met.223  She
broached the notice requirements by mentioning some of the issues,
without coming to a decision on the merits. Justice Ginsburg agreed
with the Third Circuit's determination that giving notice is "highly
problematic ... to tie to a settlement class persons with no perceptible
asbestos-related disease at the time of the settlement." 224
After presenting the impossibility of giving notice to an exposure-
only plaintiff, Justice Ginsburg avoided resolving the issue.2z Instead,
she relied on the dispositive nature of the Court's adequacy
determination;2 26 however, Justice Ginsburg suggested in dicta that
the constitutional and procedural notice problem may be insoluble in
the context of futures.227 Indeed, one scholar has pointed out that the
221. See Amchem Prods., Inc., v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
222. Justice Breyer filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, which
Justice Stevens joined. See id. at 629 (Breyer, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Justice O'Connor recused herself.
223. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 597. The Court also held that a request for a
settlement-only class certification had the same requirements as a non-settlement
class, except that a court need not take into consideration "whether the case, if tried,
would present intractable management problems." Id. at 620 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(3)(D)). The court's rationale was that the 23(e) settlement provision was not
meant to obviate the necessity of meeting all the other class certification
requirements. Id. at 620-21. Those hurdles, such as meeting typicality and
commonality, represent important policy and procedural interests, even if the case
may or may not present management difficulties under 23(e). Id. Rather, the court
construed 23(e) as "an additional requirement, not a superseding direction." Id. at
621.
224. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 628. Justice Ginsburg elaborated that exposure-only
plaintiffs "may not even know of their exposure, or realize the extent of the harm
they may incur. Even if they fully appreciate the significance of class notice, those
without current afflictions may not have the information or foresight needed to
decide intelligently, whether to stay in or opt out." Id.; see also supra note 217 and
accompanying text (explaining the Third Circuit's reasoning that even plaintiffs aware
of toxic exposure might not have enough information to decide whether to opt out of
a class action).
225. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 628 ("Because we have concluded that the class in this
case cannot satisfy the requirements of common issue predominance and adequacy of
representation, we need not rule, definitively, on the notice given here.").
226. See id. See also supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the Amchem Court's adequacy of representation decision.
227. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 628 ("In accord with the Third Circuit, however, we
recognize the gravity of the question whether class action notice sufficient under the
Constitution and Rule 23 could ever be given to legions so unselfconscious and
amorphous." (citation omitted) (emphasis added)). In the Second Circuit's decision
in Stephenson v. Dow Chemical Co., the court points to this section of the Amchem
decision as standing for the proposition that it is nearly impossible to give notice to
exposure-only class members. 273 F.3d 249, 261 n.8 (2d Cir. 2001) ("Amchem
indicates that effective notice could likely not ever be given to exposure-only class
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Court is "troubled by the inherent difficulty in alerting uninjured
individuals, including family members with unripe consortium claims,
to the terms of the settlement., 228  The "inherent difficulty" of
notifying people who suffer no injuries is a fundamental problem that
all exposure-only futures share, from workers who unknowingly
inhale asbestos to soldiers serving in Vietnam.
2. Agent Orange: The Dow Decision
In the 1984 Agent Orange class action, Judge Weinstein decided
that notice would be sent by mail to all veterans who had already filed
a claim in court or listed on the Veterans Administration's Agent
Orange Registry.229  Additionally, Judge Weinstein decided that
publication through radio and television announcements throughout
the United States, Australia, and New Zealand would be sufficient
notice for those veterans who had not filed claims or were not
registered.230 In conceding the efficacy of Weinstein's idea, one
scholar has questioned the legality of such notice.23' Furthermore, on
a practical level, the timing of the notice was questionable since the
court mailed the notice in mid-March, and the deadline for opting out
was May 1.232
In 1984, neither Daniel Stephenson nor Joe Isaacson had filed a
claim in court or placed themselves on the Veterans Administration's
Agent Orange Registry.233 They were asymptomatic234 and did not fall
members."); see also infra notes 242-43 and accompanying text (explaining how the
Amchem Court's reasoning has forged an important role in the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence, because the recent Dow decision used the Second Circuit's Amchem-
based rationale). Additionally, Professor Hazard has suggested the fundamental
difficulty in providing notice to exposure-only plaintiffs is that, "[s]tated in
epistemological terms, a 'futures' therefore is a hypothetical person. A hypothetical
person cannot have real legal rights or be owed real legal obligations." Hazard, supra
note 9, at 1907 (suggesting in the bankruptcy solution context that a hypothetical
person may or may not be a bankruptcy creditor); see also infra notes 297-301 and
accompanying text (explaining how a futures subclass will hurt bankruptcy solutions).
228. See Eric D. Green, What Will We Do When Adjudication Ends? We'll Settle in
Bunches: Bringing Rule 23 Into the Twenty-First Century, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1773,
1777-79 (1997) (advocating the use of "classwide settlements" in the wake of Amchem
and Ortiz).
229. Schuck, supra note 2, at 127. The notice alerted the 23(b)(3) plaintiff class
that the suit was commencing and gave that class the opportunity to opt-out. See
supra notes 67-68 (explaining to whom the courts provided notice).
230. Schuck, supra note 2, at 127.
231. Id. ("Weinstein's solution, which the veterans' lawyers had proposed, was
innovative but highly questionable as a matter of law."). Schuck bases his criticism
partly on Weinstein's failure to mention Eisen, which set forth the importance of
mailing notice whenever possible, as well as his failure to "discuss defendants'
argument that more individualized notice was reasonably feasible." Id.
232. Id.
233. Regardless of their knowledge of exposure, neither man had manifested any
injuries at the time. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. Doctors diagnosed
Daniel Stephenson with bone marrow cancer in 1998 and Joe Isaacson, with non-
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into the class definition, 235 but did fall into the class the settlement
purported to bind.236 Thus, they fell into the category of veterans to
whom Weinstein directed publication notice.237 According to the
veterans and their attorney, neither man saw such notice.238
Furthermore, they had no reason to believe that the Agent Orange
litigation pertained to them because they suffered no physical
manifestations from their exposure to Agent Orange. 9
When Dow Chemical Co. v. Stephenson240 reached the Supreme
Court in 2003, the 4-4 opinion shed no new light on the notice
requirements in class actions for future injury plaintiffs. Rather, the
Court reaffirmed without opinion the Second Circuit's decision.24'
There, the Second Circuit picked up on Ginsburg's position in
Amchem and similarly suggested the potential practical difficulties of
notifying the unimpaired. 242  However, despite the uncertainty
Hodgkin's lymphoma in 1996. See Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 255
(2d Cir. 2001).
234. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (describing the health of Isaacson and
Stephenson).
235. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (explaining the class definition of
people to whom the court provided notice).
236. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (summarizing the class action
settlement).
237. See supra note 230 and accompanying text (describing the class action notice
Judge Weinstein authorized).
238. See Brief for Respondents at 23 n.26, Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 123 S.
Ct. 2161 (2003) (No. 02-271) ("Neither Respondent ever received the 23(c)(2) opt out
notice, the 23(e) settlement notice, or the subsequent 'distribution notice."' (citation
omitted)). Additionally, although both men knew they had been in contact with
Agent Orange, see supra text accompanying note 1, publication notice was not
necessarily meaningful to them because their injuries were still latent at the time. The
court provided notice of the settlement, which was binding on futures, to the 23(b)(3)
class, which only included injured veterans and family members suffering from a
derivative injury. See Ryan v. Dow Chem. Co., 781 F. Supp. 902, 908 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
239. See Brief for Respondents at 23-24, Dow (No. 02-271) (explaining that even if
petitioner had made notice available to respondents, they would have had no reason
to pay it attention as they were uninjured at the time).
240. 123 S. Ct. 2161 (2003) (affirming the Second Circuit's opinion that the 1984
Agent Orange settlement did not bar Stephenson's suit).
241. Although Joe Isaacson's claim was remanded to state court in light of
Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28 (2002) (holding that for
removal jurisdiction to be appropriate, the federal court must have some form of
original jurisdiction over the case, which the All Writs Act cannot provide), the
judgment from the Second Circuit decision was affirmed for Daniel Stephenson, with
no other explanation or any dicta. See supra note 185 (explaining that this Note
presumes that the Supreme Court would have reversed in part any section of the
Second Circuit's opinion with which it disagreed). The remand of Isaacson's claim in
light of Syngenta is about the propriety of removal jurisdiction, see supra note 61, and
has no bearing on the propriety of futures subclasses in mass tort class actions.
242. Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 261 n.8 (2d Cir. 2001) ("Because
we have already concluded that these plaintiffs were inadequately represented, and
thus were not proper parties to the prior litigation, we need not definitively decide
whether notice was adequate."). This language mirrors almost exactly Justice
Ginsburg's dicta in Amchem. See supra note 227 (explaining Justice Ginsburg's
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surrounding the notice requirements, the Second Circuit ultimately
disposed of the case on the adequacy of representation grounds.243
Thus, both Amchem and Dow illustrate that when class certification
issues are dispositive, the Court need not decide the question of
notice.2" However, the two cases suggest that even if the Court were
to find adequacy requirements met for a futures subclass, it would still
be impossible to provide notice to that group of plaintiffs.245
A futures subclass faces not only constitutional and procedural
hurdles,246 but also important policy concerns. A futures subclass has
important repercussions on possible settlements,247 the tort system at
24824large, I and bankruptcy proceedings. 49 On the policy front, different
concern that notice could ever be given to futures, the "legions so unselfconscious and
amorphous.").
243. See Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 261 n.8.
244. Both Amchem and Dow were chances for the Supreme Court to speak on the
notice issue, even though it was not necessary for the outcome of the case. However,
the Court's repeated refusal to decide the issue seems to suggest that the Court is
hesitant to create any precedential value on this matter.
245. See supra note 228 and accompanying text (explaining that the Court's
vacillation on the matter might be fueled by the problem-riddled prospect of notifying
asymptomatic people). It is possible that the Court does not want to reach the notice
problem decisively because giving notice to people who have no patent injuries is
problematic, regardless of whether they are aware of possible toxic exposure. See also
supra note 217 (distinguishing between asymptomatic plaintiffs who are aware and
unaware of their exposure). Thus, the class certification issues that prevented the
Court from reaching the notice requirements may reflect the reality that certain
groups of futures will inevitably fall through the cracks of the notice requirements.
Accordingly, courts' attempts to uphold stringently the adequacy of representation
requirement is a worthwhile pursuit, but ultimately a Pyrrhic victory if courts remain
unable to notify those adequately represented futures subclasses. See supra notes 210-
11 and accompanying text (suggesting that the adequacy hurdle is important but
ultimately not relevant if courts cannot solve the problem of notice).
246. See, e.g., supra notes 118, 171, 178, 187 and accompanying text (discussing
various class settlements, including futures, which failed to meet the federal
requirements). Additionally, Professor Linda Mullenix has suggested that "prior
attempts at dealing with the futures problems have been ineffectual-if not illegal."
See Linda S. Mullenix, Back to the Futures: Privatizing Future Claims Resolution, 148
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1919, 1924-25 (2000) (advocating a severance of future claims from
present claims and privatizing those future claims). Professor Mullenix is another
participant in the published dialogue between Hazard and Wood about the best
mechanisms to manage futures. See supra note 36 (explaining Wood's criticisms of
Hazard). Mullenix shares in Professor Hazard's pessimistic thoughts regarding
futures, but has important criticisms and suggestions regarding Hazard's proposed
legislation, see supra note 9 (describing Hazard's legislative proposal), and the
privatized future claims resolution she feels would work better, see Mullenix, supra, at
1924 ("He has, of course, neglected to tell us why this proposal would appeal to
Congress, as opposed to all other failed attempts to federalize products liability
law.").
247. See infra notes 251-55, 283-94 and accompanying text (describing the
beneficial and detrimental effects a futures subclass could have on settlements).
248. See infra notes 257-62 and accompanying text (describing the role of futures in
the tort system as opposed to class actions).
249. See infra notes 263-81, 295-01 and accompanying text (describing a futures
subclass' effects on bankruptcy proceedings).
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courts and commentators are split on whether the subclass cure is an
effective remedy for the futures problem.
B. Futures Subclass Cure: Policy Considerations
How courts manage future injury plaintiffs affects not just the rights
of the futures, but defendants, current compensation schemes, and
court dockets. Thus, the subclass cure entails both benefits and
drawbacks for the litigating parties and the court system.
1. The First View: A Subclass Will Resolve the Policy Concerns of
Binding Futures in Class Actions
In the aftermath of the Supreme Court's Amchem and Dow
decisions, futures cannot be adequately represented in the same
plaintiff class as the currently injured. Thus, either futures belong in
their own plaintiff subclass,50 or they belong in the tort system.
Courts employing a futures subclass could secure three possible
benefits. First, a futures subclass could encourage defendants to settle
class actions. Also, creating a futures subclass will comport with the
underlying goals of the tort system. Finally, putting futures in a
subclass could make current bankruptcy schemes more efficient.
Therefore, retaining future injury plaintiffs in class actions, in their
own distinct subclasses, may be a viable cure to the futures problem.
a. Futures Subclass Will Increase Defendants' Incentive to Settle
While many scholars have suggested that the Amchem and Ortiz
decisions will inhibit defendants from settling,21l an implementation of
250. See infra notes 305-08 (describing proposed amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure that would purportedly monitor a subclass of future injury
plaintiffs).
251. See, e.g., Weber, supra note 172, at 1157 ("The Supreme Court's new,
heightened attention to predominance and representative adequacy is likely to bar
useful class action litigation and settlements."); see also id. at 1187 (explaining that
"useful cases will not be brought, and valuable settlements will not be achieved,
because of strict application of the predominance and representative adequacy
tests"); Laurens Walker, A Model Plan to Resolve Federal Class Action Cases by Jury
Trial, 88 Va. L. Rev. 405, 407-08 (2002) (noting that the defense's main interest is to
settle "litigation as early and as cheaply as possible, with the least publicity" (citing
Deborah R. Hensler et al., RAND Institute for Civil Justice, Class Action Dilemmas:
Pursuing Public Goals for Private Gain (2000))). However, as Walker points out,
often the global settlements the defense seeks "create little value for class members or
society." Id; cf. Deborah R. Hensler, As Time Goes By: Asbestos Litigation After
Amchem and Ortiz, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 1899, 1902 (2002) (comparing the asbestos
settlement problems to the ostensible success of the Agent Orange settlement, when
the defendants had been hoping to reach "a conclusion to the litigation" with an opt-
out class settlement and seemingly achieved their goal) [hereinafter Hensler, As Time
Goes By]. However, Hensler's illustration of the Agent Orange case as a success
story for defendants seeking finality is now inaccurate in light of the Supreme Court's
Dow decision. See supra notes 240-45 and accompanying text (describing the Dow
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those cases' suggested futures subclass remedy may actually
encourage defendants to settle class actions.252  Presumably,
defendants will be more inclined to settle cases knowing that their
future liabilities are accounted for within a futures subclass, as
opposed to remaining adrift in the tort system at large 3.2 " This would
both ensure that some monies remain available for the futures and
their protection,254 as well as providing certainty of funds to the
currently injured. 5  In addition to helping the respective parties
settle, a futures subclass could also aid the tort system at large.
b. A Futures Subclass Will Avoid Fundamental Tort System Problems
If future injury plaintiffs could not occupy a distinct subclass, they
would have to enter the tort system when their injuries manifest.2 6 In
theory, plaintiffs and defendants use the tort system to achieve
decision and how it may have dissolved the finality of Judge Weinstein's 1984
settlement for all defendants involved).
252. See Alex Raskolnikov, Note, Is There a Future for Future Claimants After
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor?, 107 Yale L.J. 2545, 2551 (1998) (suggesting that
defendants have little incentive to make a global settlement because they cannot
"evaluat[e] future claims"). Grouping futures together in a subclass is one possible
method allowing defendants to "evaluate," estimate, and manage the liabilities future
injury plaintiffs entail. Id; cf Report of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and
the Working Group on Mass Torts to the Chief Justice of the United States and to the
Judicial Conference of the United States 35 (1999) (suggesting that futures within
class actions could possibly opt-out if they so desired, hurting the integrity of possible
settlements, when they "become aware of actual injury") [hereinafter Mass Torts
Report]; Elizabeth J. Cabraser, A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course of Study Materials, Products
Liability: The Legacy of Asbestos Litigation: Challenges and Complications in the
Certification and Settlement of Product Liability Class Actions (2000) (suggesting
that symbolically, the Amchem decision has led many defendants to contest class
certification). An implementation of futures subclasses after Amchem could
presumably reverse this trend and make defendants more eager to see courts certify
classes, and to settle those class actions.
253. Defendants would probably have one set of settlement terms for current
injury plaintiffs and a different set for the future injury plaintiffs. Despite those
possible differences, defendants could still achieve finality, and current injury and
future injury plaintiffs could gain settlement terms appropriate to their level of injury,
or putative injury, respectively. A settlement for a subclass of future injury plaintiffs
would be difficult to fashion, but it is still possible. One possibility would be to give
futures their own fund subject to inflation adjustments, or perhaps a compensation
scheme similar to workers' compensation. See, e.g., Hazard, supra note 9, at 1917
(suggesting courts use a "workers' compensation formula" to calculate recovery).
254. See Mass Torts Report, supra note 252, at 35 ("Inclusion of future claimants
becomes a question not merely of achieving peace for the defendant but also of
ensuring that future claimants have an opportunity for compensation reasonably
equal to that of present claimants.").
255. Cf Carroll et al., supra note 13, at 65 (explaining that sixty-five percent of
asbestos dollars go to claimants who do not suffer from cancer, whereas only
seventeen percent of dollars end up in the hands of those suffering from
mesothelioma).
256. See supra notes 170-87 (explaining the Supreme Court's recent decisions
suggesting that future injury plaintiffs cannot procedurally share a subclass with
currently injured plaintiffs).
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individualized justice.257  In class action practice, this is very
infrequently the case.258  Thus, a distinct futures subclass would
prevent those plaintiffs from entering the tort system, which some
scholars argue provides dubious results in class actions.259
One scholar emphasized that preserving the futures' right to enter
the tort system is dangerous because it eventually undermines the tort
system's goals.26  As more plaintiffs become involved in litigation,
they sue companies with an increasingly attenuated link to asbestos
production.261 This trend jeopardizes the principles of "corrective
justice and deterrence" that tort litigation strives to achieve.26 2 Thus,
257. See Carroll et al., supra note 13, at 88 (discussing how most tort cases, whether
regular or mass, infrequently grant "individualized treatment," and how that failure is
exacerbated in the asbestos context).
258. See id.; see also Weinstein, supra note 3, at 127 (noting that some criticize class
actions on the ground that "mass dispositions compromise principles of due process
and interfere with the plaintiff's property right to control his or her claim").
Weinstein also cites the criticism that "compelling mass settlements precludes the
vindication of individual rights and denies plaintiffs the cathartic effect of telling their
stories to a judge and jury." Id. However, Weinstein does stress the importance of
flexibility and adjusting legal standards and devices to keep in tune with "the harms of
modern technological society." Id.
259. See Carroll et al., supra note 13, at 88 ("In asbestos litigation, individualized
process is a chimera."); see also Hensler, As Time Goes By, supra note 251, at 1923
(suggesting that the Georgine settlement's purported protection of futures'
"individualized due process" might be misplaced since due process in the asbestos
context is a "chimera" and unattainable despite what may be the court's best
intentions).
260. See Hensler, As Time Goes By, supra note 251, at 1923-24 (discussing the
"Future of 'Futures'); cf Weinstein, supra note 3, at 143 (explaining that the tort
system can also offer substantial rewards to individuals as opposed to class members).
Judge Weinstein mentions that class action plaintiffs will usually fare better in a class,
as opposed to suing individually, but "they would forego the possibility that any given
individual would receive a windfall verdict by a sympathetic jury." Id.
261. See Hensler, As Time Goes By, supra note 251, at 1924 (stating that many
companies which plaintiffs are currently naming as defendants are assuming liability
that "bears little relationship to their own actions"); see also Mark A. Behrens, Some
Proposals for Courts Interested in Helping Sick Claimants and Solving Serious
Problems in Asbestos Litigation, 54 Baylor L. Rev. 331, 340 (2002) (listing defendants
with a very remote link to asbestos production that plaintiffs are now naming as
defendants, such as Campbell Soup Co. and 3M Co., "the maker of Scotch® tape and
Post-it® notes").
262. See Hensler, As Time Goes By, supra note 251, at 1923-24 (discussing how
plaintiffs are naming defendants who are far removed from their injuries, thereby
undermining "the deterrence objective of tort"). However, Judge Weinstein has
suggested that the tort system's goals have shifted in recent years from "deterrence or
punishment of wrongdoers" to compensation of the injured. See Weinstein, supra
note 3, at 148. If that suggestion is true, then Hensler's concern that plaintiffs are
raiding the pockets of relatively remote defendants is not so pressing. But see
McGovern, supra note 55, at 880 (explaining that plaintiffs can jeopardize the
fundamental tort system goal of "individualized justice" by participating in a mass tort
class action and its settlement). Additionally, McGovern questions whether "the tort
system would ever countenance the contracting away of personal rights. Just as tort
law frowns upon general waivers of access to the judicial system... there may be a
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to maintain the traditional deterrence aim of the tort system, future
injury plaintiffs should occupy their own subclass, and not sue
individually when their injuries manifest. In addition to the
theoretical aims of the tort system, a futures subclass may provide
succor on a more practical level to help ineffective bankruptcy
schemes of the past.
c. A Futures Subclass Will Remedy Past Bankruptcy Solutions
The subclass cure is one possible way to heal the severe flaws in the
current regime of toxic mass tort class actions.263 One scholar has
suggested four criteria that any administrative compensation plan
must meet,"6 and illustrated why it is so difficult to implement these in
the context of the asbestos litigation.265 Specifically, anyone designing
parallel limitation to even partial de facto waivers in mass tort settlements." Id. at
881-82.
263. See, e.g., Deborah Hensler, Fashioning A National Resolution of Asbestos
Personal Injury Litigation: A Reply to Professor Brickman, 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 1967,
1990 (1992) ("However well the tort system has served us... the current system of
litigating asbestos claims is failing to deliver compensation in an equitable, efficient
fashion."). In this article, Hensler expresses deep skepticism of any administrative
compensation solution for the asbestos problem because of the factors that make
asbestos unique. See id. at 1978 (listing such factors as the "scale of the litigation," the
"changing nature of the asbestos caseload," the "impact of the bankruptcies" and the
"uncertainty about the status of claims, parties, and the law"). Hensler's article was a
response to Professor Lester Brickman's administrative scheme to help the asbestos
litigation. See Lester Brickman, The Asbestos Claims Management Act of 1991: A
Proposal to the United States Congress, 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 1891 (1992) (proposing
that the Legislature set up an administrative asbestos trust to help plaintiffs and
defendants, as well as to regulate attorneys' fees). Additionally, Professor Brickman's
proposal would not give compensation to "unimpaired pleural plaque claimants" until
they manifested an injury. Id. at 1892. Pleural plaque refers to non-cancerous growths
that x-rays can detect in the "pleural membrane" surrounding the lungs, which often
turn into cancer at a later date. See supra note 116 (describing mesothelioma and
cancerous effects on the pleural membrane surrounding the lungs). Whereas
Brickman proposes giving such claimants no compensation at all, other courts have
generated different mechanisms, such as "pleural registries," to keep these claimants
in the court system, without deciding their fate until they manifest cancer at a later
date. See infra note 302 and accompanying text (describing how courts use "pleural
registries").
264. See Hensler, supra note 263, at 1985-86. Namely, "the program must define
eligibility for compensation; specify the nature and amount of benefits available;
specify the source(s) of funding; and establish procedures for determining eligibility
and benefits in individual cases, and for appealing administrative decisions." Id.
265. See id. at 1986 (explaining that administrative programs encounter trouble
when "they underestimate the size of the population that will prove eligible for
benefits" and "the percent of that population that will come forward"). This is
exactly what has happened in the asbestos context. See Behrens, supra note 261, at
333 (explaining that costs keep rising and claims keep coming forward, to the extent
that the litigation might cost another $43.4 billion over the next twenty years (citing
Christopher Oster, Some Insurers Face Shortfall in Reserves for Costly Claims Related
to Asbestos, Wall St. J., May 7, 2001, at A4)). Behrens hypothesized that the main
reason the original estimates of asbestos claims were so wrong was that "nobody
could have predicted the enormous number of unimpaired or mildly impaired
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such a scheme must be cognizant of the diverse interests of parties
advocating for plaintiffs and defendants, the need to limit transaction
costs, and overriding equitable concerns. 266 Thus, it has been267 and
will be extremely difficult to establish an administrative compensation
scheme that can handle all these competing concerns.268
In the asbestos litigation, bankruptcies and bankruptcy trusts
constitute the only administrative schemes enacted by the courts and
Congress.2 69 These schemes have not been very successful, frequently
individuals who would file asbestos claims.... Individuals who have little or no
physical impairment now account for as much as ninety percent of all new asbestos-
related filings." Id. at 342. Thus, Behrens attributes the difficulty in managing
asbestos claims to the phenomenon of mildly impaired or healthy claimants "driving
the avalanche of filings" into the system. Id.
266. See Hensler, supra note 263, at 1986 (discussing how some parties are
concerned with the moral rights of injured victims, or the need to keep transaction
costs low with "simple 'schedules"' and "highly bureaucratized procedures
determining eligibility," or the equity of individual victims).
267. The only administrative compensation schemes that have been tested in the
asbestos arena are bankruptcy trusts. See infra notes 269-76 and accompanying text
(discussing past bankruptcy proceedings). However, scholars have been generating
proposals for an asbestos-specific administrative compensation scheme for many
years; in fact, Professor Hensler's article was in response to one such proposal. See
Brickman, supra note 263 (proposing an administrative asbestos solution to
Congress).
268. See Hensler, supra note 263, at 1987 ("I would expect that the path to reaching
such compromises with regard to asbestos injury compensation will be extraordinarily
rocky."); cf. Mullenix, supra note 246, at 1928-29 (proposing an administrative scheme
that entails the privatization of future claims). Professor Mullenix envisions a
streamlined administrative process where judges transfer the management and
compensation of a set of future claims to a "future claims vendor" via a bidding
process. Id. at 1929. These vendors would, in turn, work with defendants to assume
the responsibility for the futures. Id.
Mullenix thinks that the privatized vendor would then have an economic
incentive to accurately predict the number of future claims in their bargaining with
defendants to take on the futures. See id. at 1930 ("The privatization of future claims
resolution would work because it would call into existence commercial vendors with
an economic incentive to maximize profit by accurately estimating the universe of
future claimants and by minimizing transaction costs in administering claims.").
However, Mullenix admits that her proposal is "semi-shocking," id. at 1931, and
therefore does not contradict Hensler's assertion that administrative suggestions are a
"rocky" path, Hensler, supra note 263, at 1987.
269. See White, supra note 116, at 1321 (explaining that Congress adopted in 1994 a
set of "bankruptcy provisions designed to facilitate the reorganization of firms with
large asbestos liabilities" (referring to 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)-(h) (1994))). Those special
chapter 11 provisions provided defendants with "a discharge from present and future
personal injury and property damage claims" and established trusts for personal
injury, including present and future, as well as property damage claims. Id. at 1322.
Also, the new Bankruptcy Code "requires that a representative be appointed to
negotiate on behalf of the future personal injury claimants" and that present and
future claimants receive similar treatment. Id. Ultimately, "in return for half or more
of the reorganized firm's equity, the firm can emerge from bankruptcy free of
asbestos liabilities." See id. (citing G. Marcus Cole, A Calculus Without Consent:
Mass Tort Bankruptcies, Future Claimants, and the Problem of Third Party Non-
Debtor "Discharge," 84 Iowa L. Rev. 753 (1999)); cf. Alan N. Resnick, Bankruptcy as
a Vehicle for Resolving Enterprise- Threatening Mass Tort Liability, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev.
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hurting those plaintiffs who are currently extremely sick270 and short-
changing the future injury plaintiffs as well.271  A subclass of future
injury plaintiffs could obviate the past insufficiencies and problems for
all parties that have been involved in past bankruptcy solutions.272
If futures occupy their own subclass, then courts could model
bankruptcy trusts for the ascertained and currently injured, and
possibly a separate one for the subclass of futures.273  Establishing
bankruptcy trusts for the currently injured, without the concomitant
uncertainties of future claims, would both preserve funds for the
futures274 and make more money available for the currently injured.275
Also, this scheme would stop the pattern of plaintiffs suing defendants
who are only "peripherally" involved in asbestos products.276
2045, 2074 (2000) (suggesting that the 1994 "asbestos amendments" only confuse
whether other Bankruptcy Code provisions apply to asbestos claims after
reorganization, since the amendments refer to those claims as future "demands" as
opposed to "claims" that the Bankruptcy Code specifically handles).
270. See, e.g., Hensler, As Time Goes By, supra note 251, at 1924 (explaining how
most asbestos workers seeking a settlement have "little or no impairment," as
opposed to those who are extremely sick); see also Behrens, supra note 261, at 338
("As a result of the asbestos lawsuit explosion, resources needed to compensate truly
injured people are steadily being depleted.").
271. See Hensler, As Time Goes By, supra note 251, at 1924 (explaining that
Amchem and Ortiz's mandates to protect all future injury plaintiffs might "put at risk
those future victims who have the most at stake" since presumably there will be "very
little money left on the table" in the future, based on the current trend of the asbestos
litigation).
272. See, e.g., Resnick, supra note 269, at 2076 (suggesting that courts must strike a
balance between the needs of reorganized companies and the needs of future injury
claimants). Resnick proposes altering Bankruptcy Code section 101, defining
"claim," to include a new definition for "mass future claim" as one way to solve this
problem. Id. at 2075. He further suggests that companies should be able to fashion
bankruptcy around future claims if there is a "rational basis" for estimating the
number of possible future claims. Id. at 2077 (adding that if the future tort liability is
too "speculative" for a rational basis for estimation, that company should delay
bankruptcy until a later date when this is feasible).
273. See infra notes 277-80 and accompanying text (describing a bankruptcy
scheme solely addressing future injury claimants).
274. See generally Carroll et al., supra note 13, at 67 (explaining that the Manville
Trust had been paying ten percent of future claims' liquidated value but had to drop
down to five percent in July of 2001 to "preserve" the quickly depleting funds).
275. See Behrens, supra note 261, at 349-50 (explaining that combining future and
current injury plaintiffs in "mass trial procedures" gives less money to the currently
injured than they would get if "their cases were decided individually"). He explains
that many futures currently receive money "at the expense of impaired victims." Id. at
350.
276. See id. at 339-40 (highlighting how bankruptcies of large corporations have
"strong ripple effects" because plaintiffs' lawyers bring in other "'peripheral
defendants"' to sue when the "'traditional defendants"' are bankrupt (quoting In re
Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 129 BR. 710, 747-48 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991)));
Hensler, As Times Goes By, supra note 251, at 1920 (emphasizing that attacking new
defendants when others go bankrupt creates more bankruptcies such that "more
litigation is stayed," more money is unavailable for all claimants, and the new targets
for bankruptcy "may adopt new defensive strategies" since the stakes are so high,
increasing overall transaction costs); White, supra note 116, at 1328 (explaining that
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To fix the past bankruptcy problems, one judge-Judge Wood-has
made a suggestion that takes the futures subclass cure one step
further.277 Wood has emphasized that futures fall into two categories:
those who are ascertainable and aware of their exposure, and those
who are unaware of their exposure, and are therefore
unascertainable. 278 Thus, defendants could fashion bankruptcy trusts
on a reliable number of ascertainable futures.279  For the
unascertained, defendants could either fashion a separate bankruptcy
trust for them, or possibly leave them to fend for themselves in the
tort system. 280 Additionally, courts could also funnel this group of
asbestos claims are now filed "against more than 6,000 corporations" in "half of the
industries in the U.S. economy"). Behrens describes this vicious cycle as a domino
effect:
[P]ayments to the unimpaired have encouraged more filings by other
unimpaired claimants; this has further depleted the assets of the defendant
companies and forced many of them into bankruptcy; as more companies
have been driven into bankruptcy, the process has accelerated because more
and more liability is pushed over onto fewer and fewer companies; to make
up for the shares of those companies, defendants with increasingly
attenuated connections to asbestos are being pulled into the litigation; these
peripheral defendants are now starting to collapse under the great weight of
claims against them, just as the companies that came before them in the
litigation.
Behrens, supra note 261, at 341.
277. See Wood, supra note 36, at 1941 (suggesting how to reconcile the interests of
futures with bankruptcy solutions by focusing on future claims that are ascertainable).
278. See id. at 1934-36. This Note combines ascertained and unascertained futures
in the same fashion, since both may have long-latency period injuries. However,
Judge Wood's suggestion to split the futures along the lines of exposure-awareness
might be effective, and echoes the Third Circuit's dicta in Georgine. See supra note
217. Wood's suggestion might be especially beneficial in the bankruptcy arena since
the crux of bankruptcy is comparing assets to liabilities and creditors' claims. See
supra note 211 (describing how ascertained plaintiffs would be putative creditors,
helping a corporation to formulate their "schedule of debts" in bankruptcy and
gaining their "valid discharge" against future claims). Thus, it is valuable to include
ascertained futures in bankruptcy calculations. Judge Wood's suggestion then
effectively splits the futures into two different subclasses, the ascertained and the
unascertained. See id.
279. See Carroll et al., supra note 13, at 67-68 (explaining how the increasing
number of futures coming out of the woodwork has deeply impacted bankruptcy
trusts and their ability to pay out liquidated claims); see also White, supra note 116, at
1323 ("The MPIST [Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust] did not find the
compensation business to be smooth sailing."). White has documented the success, or
lack thereof, of the MPIST: as of 2000, "nearly 500,000 claims had been filed, $2.2
billion had been paid out, and the average payment to claimants over the history of
the MPIST had dropped to about $8,000." Id. at 1324 (citing a table from the MPIST
website, at http://www.mantrust.org (last visited Jan. 29, 2004)).
280. See Wood, supra note 36, at 1937. Judge Wood suggests putting that group of
unknown and unaccounted for futures out of a subclass and into the tort system.
However, that could potentially undermine the tort system's goals and decrease the
defendant's incentive to settle. See supra notes 256-62 and accompanying text
(explaining why futures subclasses will avert the possible undermining of the tort
system).
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futures into a payment scheme similar to workers' compensation, at
the time of injury manifestation.281
Overall, the entire theory behind a futures subclass is inherently
uncertain because it predicts future injuries and future claims. Thus,
the futures subclass has possible drawbacks which may vitiate any
possible benefits.
2. The Opposing View: The Subclass Cure Is Worse than the Disease
According to some, a futures subclass is a bad idea not only for
procedural and constitutional reasons,282 but also because of important
practical and policy concerns. First, defendants would not enter into
settlements that include futures subclasses of plaintiffs. Second,
futures subclasses would destroy the benefits of current bankruptcy
solutions effectively managing the long-latency future injury problem.
Third, it is nearly impossible for defendants and courts to establish
settlements or administrative solutions for a distinct subclass of people
that do not currently exist in the eyes of the law.
a. A Futures Subclass Will Encourage Defendants to Settle, if at All,
Only with the Currently Injured
One scholar has argued that Amchem has made class action
settlements, in certain circumstances, "improbable." '283 Defendants in
personal injury class action settlements have an incentive to settle if
they can either secure for themselves a bill of peace,284 or "receive a
281. See Hazard, supra note 9, at 1917 (suggesting that part of his proposed
Legislative solution comprise a payment scheme similar to workers compensation).
282. See supra notes 191-249 and accompanying text (describing the procedural and
constitutional shortcoming of a futures subclass for mass tort class actions).
283. McGovern, supra note 55, at 878. McGovern also suggests that it has "also
prompted substantial introspection at a more conceptual level regarding fundamental
questions of fairness and efficiency in the tort compensation system." Id.
284. See id. at 872 (explaining that defendants have a "search for certainty" that
fuels their desire to settle, and how recent decisions have made the future of such
settlements "skeptical" and "have created barriers to early global resolution"); see
also Weinstein, supra note 3, at 136. Judge Weinstein suggested that Rule 23(b)(3)
class actions allowing plaintiffs to opt out "theoretically reduce the ability of this
device to deliver 'global peace' in the mass tort context-as does what some perceive
(wrongly, in my opinion) to be the inability to join claims filed in state court or to
bind future claimants." Id. Based on that statement, Weinstein presumably thinks
that, contrary to what many believe, it is quite possible to bind future injury claimants.
This viewpoint is in keeping with his decision regarding Isaacson and Stephenson's
claim in 2001 to grant defendant's motion to dismiss. See Stephenson v. Dow Chem.
Co., 273 F.3d 249, 256 (2d Cir. 2001) ("Judge Weinstein granted this motion from the
bench following argument, rejecting plaintiffs' argument that they were inadequately
represented and concluding that plaintiffs' suit was an impermissible collateral attack
on the prior settlement."). But see id. at 261 (finding that contrary to Weinstein's
determination, the plaintiffs "were inadequately represented in the prior litigation,
based on the Supreme Court's teaching in Amchem and Ortiz"). Accordingly,
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discount for paying that money sooner than the litigation system
usually requires. ' '21 If futures have their own subclass, defendants
will not be able to achieve these settlement goals.286 First, members of
a futures subclass could create a looming threat of collateral attack
upon past judgments by arguing that they were improperly bound.28 7
In the post-Dow world, a putative futures subclass could sue an
unsuspecting defendant at any time.288 Second, a futures subclass of
indeterminate size would subject defendants to unlimited liability.289
Finally, congressional attempts to help defendants achieve global
peace through class action settlements have so far failed.29°
Empirical studies substantiate these concerns: many defendants
have ceased agreeing to settle in the post-Amchem era,291 because
Weinstein's impressions in 1995 regarding a court's ability to bind futures seem
fallible today.
285. McGovern, supra note 55, at 881. McGovern explains the phrase "discount"
by explaining the economic principle that defendants expect to pay less "per item" if
they buy a large amount of items at one time. Id. In the asbestos context, this
proposition means that if the defendants settle a large number of claims in a class
action, they expect to pay less per claim than they would otherwise if they were
defending against each claim individually.
286. See, e.g., Mass Torts Report, supra note 252, at 35 (explaining that giving
futures in a class action the opportunity to opt out when they manifest injury, could
"discourage settlement by making global peace difficult, if not impossible, for
defendants to obtain"). Also, the Report questioned whether defendants could ever
form settlements when it is so difficult to notify futures about those proceedings. See
id. ("It also is difficult, if not impossible, to provide meaningful notice to people who
may not even be aware of their past exposure.").
287. See supra notes 142-63 and accompanying text (arguing that inadequately
represented futures may collaterally attack a judgment that purports to bind them).
288. See supra notes 180-87 and accompanying text (discussing the Dow case and
how futures can no longer adequately represent their interests in the same plaintiff
subclass as current injury plaintiffs).
289. See Wood, supra note 36, at 1936 (emphasizing, in the bankruptcy context,
that defendants are hesitant to get involved with an unknown number of claims of
unknown dollar value).
290. See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2003, H.R. 1115, 108th Cong. (2003). In
October of 2003, the Senate "effectively terminat[ed] consideration of... the bill."
Robert T. Horst et al., Civil Justice Reform-Law Firms, The Metropolitan Corp.
Counsel, Nov. 15, 2003, at 45. The A.L.I. commented on the bill's previous
incarnation, the Class Action Fairness Act of 1999, as an attempt to "'re-federalize'
class actions by removing them from state courts and resting them in federal courts.
Cabraser, supra note 252, at *1. Making class action certification increasingly
federalized would create an added incentive for defendants to settle them, since such
settlements would be immune from state court attack. See McGovern, supra note 55,
at 877-78 ("If, however, it is possible to have a settlement class certified in federal
court, the state court problems of finality can be overcome by federal jurisdiction.").
However, this legislation failed and "mass tort class actions in federal court are now
viewed with skepticism by many parties." Id. at 877.
291. See Carroll et al., supra note 13, at 61 ("Many interviewees noted that the
Center for Claims Resolution (CCR), the leading example of asbestos defendant
cooperation, has ceased settling claims against its members."); see also Hensler, As
Time Goes By, supra note 251, at 1906 (explaining that the CCR has disbanded and
stopped settling claims as of August 1, 2000). Hensler noted that after Amchem, five
members of the CCR have not only ceased settling, but have sought further
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previous settlements have not guaranteed global resolution.2 92 This
trend places defendants in an uncertain settlement position, but also
hurts the compensation prospects for plaintiffs293 and increases the
transaction costs for all litigating parties.294 In addition to settlements,
a futures subclass could also have a chilling effect on bankruptcies in
the future.
b. A Futures Subclass Will Inhibit Efficient Bankruptcy Solutions
Throughout the vicissitudes of the asbestos litigation, bankruptcy
has "emerged as the only means for firms to limit their asbestos
liabilities. '295 Most bankruptcy schemes make provisions for present
and future injury plaintiffs.2 96 Removing these futures into their own
distinct subclass would disturb the current bankruptcy trusts,297 vitiate
the benefits those trusts have provided298 and would waste the high
protection through bankruptcy proceedings. See id. at 1906-07.
292. See generally Carroll et al., supra note 13, at 61 (discussing how defendants are
"moving away from block settlements" and litigating individual claims when possible,
since presumably block settlements are no longer ensuring global resolution). See also
id. at 79 (explaining how the failure of settlements adversely affects futures, in
addition to the currently injured, since bankruptcy surges and failure of settlements
are working together to deplete the funds available for all the injured); cf id. at 68
(explaining how many bankruptcies have shifted liability around such that individual
defendants are facing costs higher than expected, and subsequently "abandon[ing]
previous settlement practices intended to avoid litigation costs and pursu[ing] more
aggressive-and more expensive-litigation strategies").
293. See id. The monies available to pay current and future claims are directly
correlated to how much money the defendants have in their coffers. If the defendants
are incurring many expenses by litigating as opposed to settling, there will be
correspondingly less money for the plaintiffs. See id; see also Behrens, supra note 261,
at 332-33 (explaining that settlements create transaction costs, taking away possible
funds for plaintiffs).
294. See Carroll et al., supra note 13, at 78 (projecting that total asbestos litigation
costs in the future could be between $145 and $210 billion).
295. White, supra note 116, at 1321. But see Edith H. Jones, Rough Justice in Mass
Future Claims: Should Bankruptcy Courts Direct Tort Reform?, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 1695,
1722 (1998) (warning that bankruptcies may very well be a poor substitute for a true
solution, such as "substantive or procedural tort reform"). Judge Jones raises doubts
about whether mass future claims "have anything to do with bankruptcy, or whether
they are a contrivance to shoehorn mass tort litigation into a coercive, collective
settlement that preserves management control and shareholder equity." Id.
Accordingly, she suggests that bankruptcy is "merely a means, not an end in mass tort
litigation" and that Congress should make tort reforms to take care of the futures
problem, as opposed to bankruptcy courts. Id.
296. See generally Carroll et al., supra note 13, at 67 ("The trusts are required to
provide for future claimants and, consequently, are generally concerned about being
sure there will be money for future claimants.").
297. See, e.g., Resnick, supra note 269, at 2092 (concluding that bankruptcy is "an
appropriate framework for resolving enterprise-threatening mass tort liability").
298. See Carroll et al., supra note 13, at 62 (explaining how the Manville Trust has
paid out seventy percent of its total dollars to plaintiffs). But see id. at 64 (highlighting
that most defendants pay sixty-five percent of the compensation to non-cancerous
plaintiffs, and thirty-five percent to those suffering from lung cancer, other cancers,
and mesothelioma). See supra note 116 for a thorough description of mesothelioma.
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transaction costs the defendant companies have incurred during
bankruptcy proceedings.2 99 Also, it would be difficult on a practical
level to fashion bankruptcy settlements around a futures subclass of
indeterminate size.3" Thus, bankruptcy cannot be effective if futures
occupy an amorphous subclass.3"' The problems that a futures
subclass could unleash in the context of bankruptcies are illustrative
of the more general management problems the subclass could create
in class actions.
c. A Futures Subclass Creates Difficult Management Problems
Although the legality of a futures subclass is unclear, very few
commentators have suggested how a court should manage a futures
subclass on a practical basis. As one scholar has suggested, it is
difficult for courts to treat an unlimited group of hypothetical
people.3 °2 One method of managing futures would be to allow them to
opt out from a Rule 23(b)(3) class at the time when they do manifest
injuries.30 3  However, that scheme could create the same
299. See Carroll et al., supra note 13, at 72 (explaining that a bankruptcy
reorganization costs about three percent of a firm's value). However, once a
company has formed a bankruptcy trust after the reorganization process, transaction
costs are relatively low. See id. at 62 (using the Manville Trust as an example, in which
plaintiffs receive seventy percent of the funds). The downsides to bankruptcy trusts
are that the monies are limited, and that most trusts do not limit attorneys' fees. See
id. (citing the Manville Trust as an exception, since it limits attorneys' fees to no more
than twenty-five percent).
300. See Wood, supra note 36, at 1936 (asserting that "[a] solution based on
bankruptcy is doomed because of the difficulty in measuring liabilities, at least where
it is impossible to ascertain at the time of filing either the number of future claimants
or the average size of their claims"). Wood notes that after Amchem and Ortiz, her
paper has "a distinctly pessimistic tone" because "[n]othing will really work, we are
told, for any kind of futures case." Id. (italics omitted).
301. Cf Resnick, supra note 269, at 2074-75 (explaining how certain companies can
use bankruptcy to "insulate" themselves from future liability from future injury
claimants); supra notes 277-80 and accompanying text (describing Judge Wood's
proposal that courts fashion bankruptcy trusts around ascertainable numbers of
plaintiffs). However, that suggestion conceded that bankruptcy schemes for the
unascertainable futures are problematic. See supra note 280.
302. See Hazard, supra note 9, at 1907 (explaining the fundamental difficulty in
courts' identifying future claims by putative claimants and subsequently concluding
those claimants' rights). But see supra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing the
inactive docket solution some state courts have espoused to manage future injury
plaintiffs). In response to the future injury problem, judges in cities such as Syracuse,
Seattle, and Greenville, North Carolina have adopted inactive dockets or "pleural
registries," see supra note 263, to help manage their overburdened court dockets. See
Dunbar & Martin, supra note 89 (describing how different courts manage claimants
who demonstrate pleural plaque, but not cancer). Importantly, those courts toll the
statute of limitations for such "unimpaired claimants," who can enter the active
docket when "impairment can be documented." Id. However, this solution only
encompasses the subset of futures that are aware of their exposure and can sign up for
the registry of unimpaired claimants.
303. See, e.g., Daniel M. Weddle, Settlement Class Actions and "Mere-Exposure"
Future Claimants: Problems in Mass Toxic Tort Liability, 47 Drake L. Rev. 113, 136-
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inconsistencies and confusion courts are facing today.3°4  Some
scholars have also suggested amending the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to take care of a futures subclass.3 °5 However, courts would
still face certain concerns about how to manage this subclass.30 6
Importantly, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules has recently
proposed an addition to Rule 23 to incorporate the futures.3 7
38 (1998) (proposing to allow futures to opt-out of a settlement when they manifest
their injuries). Weddle recognizes that this plan requires a payment schedule at the
time of class certification, and jeopardizes funds for the currently injured. Id. at 137.
However, this scheme "avoids zero recovery" for long-latency plaintiffs and helps the
"perennial problem" of giving futures "adequate notice of a class action or
settlement." Id. See also supra notes 210-45 and accompanying text for an
explanation of the problems of providing notice to futures. Additionally, the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules has suggested a similar Rule 23(b)(3) opt out
class action as a possible vehicle for futures. See Mass Torts Report, supra note 252, at
34-35 (discussing the futures problem generally). This proposed Rule suggests that
futures should be a class, or a subclass, in order to be certified. See id. app. F-6 at 3. It
also makes provisions to adequately represent future injury claimants with a court-
designated counsel, and provide notice to the "class or subclass by the best means
practicable, including individual notice to each member that can be identified through
reasonable effort." Id. Furthermore, notice "must be directed to a central judicial
authority in each state, and must be published in suitable popular media at yearly
intervals for the duration of the action." Id.
304. If futures could opt out whenever they manifest injury, the defendants might
still be unable to limit their liability. This futures subclass could prove to be a forever-
revolving door of plaintiffs manifesting injuries, staying in, opting out and possibly
arguing that intra-class conflicts preclude a finding of Rule 23(a)(4) adequacy of
representation. Thus, the futures subclass solution, upon application, could move in a
full circle back to the original problem of combining future and current injury
plaintiffs in one plaintiff class.
305. See Brian Wolfman & Alan B. Morrison, Representing the Unrepresented in
Class Actions Seeking Monetary Relief, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 439, 495-98 (1996)
(suggesting a possible amendment to Rule 23(e) and a new rule to ensure the
protection of future claimants). The authors suggested Rule 23(e) should read:
In considering any proposed settlement under this Rule in which some class
members would only be entitled to relief if certain events occur in the future,
the court shall determine whether, for such class members, other or
additional relief is required to assure that the settlement is fair to those class
members.
Id. at 497.
306. See id. (suggesting that this amendment would force courts to examine
whether special protections in the settlement, such as medical monitoring, might be
required "relief" for futures). However, Wolfman and Morrison concede that a court
may very well decide that certain settlement protections for futures are not necessary
after all. See id. ("The court might ultimately conclude that the other benefits for
future class members warranted the abrogation of the medical-monitoring claims, but
it could not avoid the issue." (emphasis added)). Thus, Wolfman and Morrison are
primarily concerned with courts confronting the issue of future claims. Their proposal
does not specify what type of settlement benefits nor how many benefits would render
that settlement "fair" as to the futures. Id. at 495-98. Finally, Wolfman and Morrison
propose a new Rule that would give courts discretion to include inflation adjustments
in a settlement that binds futures. See id. at 497. While Wolfman and Morrison's
second proposed Rule addresses one concern futures subclasses may face, it does not
clarify what types of settlements for futures are fair in the first place.
307. See Mass Torts Report, supra note 252, app. F-6 (proposing Civil Rule 23.3,
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However, that proposal encompasses all holders of future claims,
leaving intact the confusion surrounding the treatment of futures who
"know who they are today."308  That important distinction might
necessitate a new approach to analyzing the futures problem today.
III. THE FUTURE OF A FUTURES SUBCLASS: COURTS MUST SPLIT
FUTURES IN Two
Although most commentators doubt whether a court can include
futures in mass tort class actions with current injury plaintiffs, a partial
solution might lie in a closer examination of the futures themselves.
Courts might address the differences between futures aware and those
unaware of their exposure to a toxin by allocating some futures to the
tort system and the remainder to a plaintiff subclass.
A. Futures and Current Injury Plaintiffs Do Not Belong Together
The Supreme Court has clearly stated that future injury plaintiffs
cannot adequately represent their interests in the same plaintiff class
as current injury plaintiffs." 9 The Ortiz Court even specified that
plaintiffs with these differing injuries must occupy "homogenous
subclasses."3 ' The Court's recent jurisprudence has little doubt that
future injury plaintiffs can no longer share a plaintiff class with current
injury plaintiffs.
However, each of the Supreme Court's decisions suggesting futures
subclasses has also raised equally important concerns about how to
provide notice to such a subclass."' Neither Amchem nor Ortiz
reached these notice issues because the Court disposed of the cases on
class certification grounds.312 Nevertheless, the Court seemed highly
"Future Mass Tort Claimant Class Action"). This proposed Rule suggests that
futures should be a class, or a subclass, in order to be certified. See id. at 2. It also
makes provisions to adequately represent future injury claimants with court-
designated counsel, and provide notice to the "class or subclass by the best means
practicable, including individual notice to each member that can be identified through
reasonable effort." Id. at 3.
308. See Wood, supra note 36, at 1941 (describing how courts should separate the
futures who are aware of their exposure from those who are not).
309. See supra notes 167-87 and accompanying text (describing the Amchem, Ortiz
and Dow Courts' findings about adequacy of representation).
310. See supra note 177 and accompanying text (explaining the Ortiz Court's
mandate that futures constitute a distinct subclass).
311. See supra notes 219-45 and accompanying text (describing the Amchem and
Dow Courts' treatment of notice).
312. See supra notes 221-45 and accompanying text (describing the Amchem and
Dow Courts' failure to decide the notice issue since adequacy of representation was
dispositive in both instances).
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skeptical that future injury plaintiffs could ever receive sufficient
notice.3"3
Part of the reason the Court may have been so skeptical is because
it had yet to address the differences between the future claimants
themselves. While the Court has made great strides to separate the
future injury from the current injury plaintiffs, the treatment of
futures is still a work in progress. It is important that the Court
recognize that future injury plaintiffs themselves have significant
differences that might demand different treatment.
B. All Futures Do Not Belong Together
Some lower courts have differentiated between futures who have
manifested injuries after a settlement and those who have manifested
injuries after settlement fund depletion.3"4  However, those
distinctions overlook a critical and more fundamental divide: the split
between futures aware of their exposure and those with no knowledge
of it whatsoever.315 Exposure-awareness does not depend on class
action settlement deadlines or dates of fund depletion. Thus, deciding
the fate of futures based on their date of manifestation and
subsequent eligibility for compensation is an incomplete solution to
the problem.31 6
As an example, a worker in an asbestos-producing factory and a
Vietnam veteran who loaded Agent Orange onto planes would
presumably be aware of their exposure to a toxin from the moment of
engagement with the product. These two hypotheticals are examples
of exposure-aware plaintiffs.
317
Courts need to oversee or provide class action notice that pinpoints
the unique situation of such futures.3"' Although some scholars doubt
that those currently healthy would ever heed such notice,319 courts
313. See, e.g., supra note 245 and accompanying text (hypothesizing that if the
Amchem or Dow Courts had reached the question of notice, the Courts would have
found such notice impossible to provide).
314. See supra notes 128-37 and accompanying text (discussing the findings of the
Ryan court and Second Circuit's findings in Ivy, both of which stressed the futures'
eligibility for compensation, as opposed to whether they were sick at the time of the
settlement).
315. See supra notes 278-80 and accompanying text (describing Judge Diane
Wood's division of futures into the "ascertained" and "unascertained").
316. See supra notes 128-37 and accompanying text (describing the Second Circuit's
early decisions in this area and flaws in those decisions).
317. See supra note 217 and accompanying text (explaining the Third Circuit's
distinctions between types of plaintiffs based on their awareness of exposure).
318. See supra note 125 (explaining that the Supreme Court has combined all
futures together under the term "exposure-only").
319. See supra note 211 and accompanying text (explaining Professor Mark
Weber's view that courts cannot provide "meaningful notice" that would permit
plaintiffs "to make sensible individual decisions whether to accept or reject the
settlement").
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should shoulder the burden3 21 of providing "meaningful notice 3 21 that
would make futures become selfconscious 3 22 enough to decide how
they want to redress their latent injuries.
A court could place these exposure-aware futures into a futures
subclass at the time of class action certification. Then, the court
would provide widespread notice3 23 to alert the exposure-aware
futures of their legal status as a subclass in the litigation.324 At this
point, all exposure-aware futures who wish to join the class action
could opt-in to the futures subclass. The opt-in decision would have
very little practical significance to them at the time, but would have
manifold significance later if and when they became sick.32 5
This opt-in futures subclass would permit defendants to form
settlements with both currently injured plaintiffs3 26  and the
320. This Note does not propose that courts should be solely economically
responsible for providing this notice. An equitable division of costs for futures
subclasses is beyond this Note's scope. By "burden," this Note suggests that courts
must take control of the notification of futures and bear the responsibility of making
sure this notice is sufficient to alert currently healthy people to their inclusion in a
futures subclass.
321. See supra note 211. This Note does not propose the specifics such notice
would entail. However, a clearly worded disclaimer addressed to anyone aware of
toxic exposure, whether currently sick or healthy, could sufficiently alert putative
plaintiffs of their legal rights. It does not seem overly burdensome for courts to
explain that, because of the long latency period associated with some chemicals,
holders of future injury claims might be healthy today.
322. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (explaining the use of the term
"selfconsciousness" and "unselfconsciousness" in this Note).
323. To cast as wide a net as possible, courts should consider serving notice through
multiple media, from television, radio and newspapers to union offices, locker rooms
and company bathrooms. While this proposal might seem farfetched, all proposals to
deal with a problem of this scope will inevitably be "semi-shocking." See supra note
268 (explaining Professor Mullenix's privatization proposal and her own
characterization of its shock value). Also, this suggested notice is similar to the
widespread notice the Advisory Committee has proposed. See supra note 303 and
accompanying text (explaining the Advisory Committee's suggestion of spreading
notice through the media for the duration of the litigation involving futures' rights).
324. While courts usually disseminate notice to permit plaintiffs to opt out of Rule
23(b)(3) class actions, see supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text, this proposal
advocates the reverse scenario of opting-in to a futures subclass after notice.
Importantly, this Note does not address the procedural and constitutional
implications of an opt-in class. The author only proposes an opt-in class to illustrate
one possible way for courts to capture the exposure-aware plaintiffs, and distinguish
them from their exposure-unaware counterparts. See supra notes 125, 278-80 and
accompanying text (explaining Judge Diane Wood's suggestion to split up futures
depending on their awareness of exposure).
325. See supra notes 233-39 and accompanying text (explaining that Isaacson and
Stephenson saw no notice and had no idea that a class action was adjudicating their
rights). Importantly, Isaacson and Stephenson were both aware of their exposure to
Agent Orange. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (highlighting that both
veterans knew they were in close contact to Agent Orange when they were serving in
Vietnam).
326. See supra notes 283-84 and accompanying text (describing how a broad futures
subclass would inhibit defendants from settling with the currently injured).
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ascertained subclass of future injury plaintiffs.327 For defendants'
purposes, both groups would look like present injury plaintiffs.328
However, for the ascertained subclass, the defendants could fashion
settlements with terms specific to their situation.3 29  Thus, an
ascertained futures subclass would help future injury plaintiffs receive
funds,330 and current injury plaintiffs would not suffer from the
inclusion of the futures subclass. 3
It may be difficult for plaintiffs to discern which category they
occupy along the spectrum between exposure-aware and exposure-
unaware. For example, a typical worker in a soup can company would
have an equal probability of being aware or unaware of asbestos
exposure.332 As to that grey area of plaintiffs, courts should try to
disseminate detailed, informative notice to catalyze these plaintiffs
into selfconsciousness. 33 The plaintiffs who remain unselfconscious
after such notice would remain, by default, exposure-unaware futures
without a distinct subclass to protect their rights.
Finally, an asbestos worker sitting in a clean office overseeing other
workers, or a Vietnam veteran who never saw a can of defoliant or
spent any time in the jungle represent the opposite end of the
exposure-aware spectrum; they are exposure-unaware plaintiffs.334
The opt-in scheme proposed here-for exposure-aware plaintiffs-
does not work for them.335
People who are unaware that they have inhaled a toxin could be
327. See supra note 125 (explaining Judge Wood's division of ascertained futures in
the bankruptcy context, which is equally applicable in the settlement context). Judge
Wood believes that once courts identify futures aware of their exposure, such futures
could "in some ... intelligent way participate in a suit." Wood, supra note 36, at 1941.
328. See supra note 186 (describing medical monitoring and how the futures
ascertainable by the court can look like present injury claimants to defendants).
329. For example, the settlement might contain inflation protection. See supra note
115 and accompanying text (discussing the settlement terms that are specifically
favorable for futures as opposed to current injury plaintiffs).
330. See supra note 125 (explaining that ascertained futures could participate in the
suit in some form). Presumably, such participation would entail procuring funds
when healthy ascertained futures do become sick.
331. See supra notes 283-88 and accompanying text (explaining how a general
futures subclass containing unascertained futures hurts current injury plaintiffs'
chance of coming to a settlement with defendants).
332. See supra note 261 and accompanying text (describing how the asbestos
litigation has spread to industries that many people would not necessarily link to
asbestos, such as soup production).
333. See supra notes 320-23 and accompanying text (explaining how the courts
must give detailed notice to inform asymptomatic but exposure-aware plaintiffs of
their rights).
334. See supra note 217 (explaining the Third Circuit's description of exposure-
unaware plaintiffs).
335. See supra text accompanying note 325 (describing this Note's futures subclass
opt-in proposal).
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unselfconscious forever;336 no widespread, court-ordered notice337
could possibly alert them to their role in a class action. Exposure-
unaware futures could only become aware when they manifest
injuries"' or receive some fortuitous reminder or external notification
telling them that they were exposed.33 9 If certain futures are not
aware of their own exposure, the court cannot be aware of their
exposure either. Accordingly, the court cannot fashion those futures
into a distinct futures subclass.34 °
Therefore, exposure-unaware futures should enter the traditional
tort system when they do manifest injuries. While this might
eventually undermine tort theories of deterrence,34' it would support
theories of individualized justice for claimants seeking compensation
for injury.342 Also, while some scholars and the Federal Rules
Advisory Committee have proposed changing the Federal Rules of
Procedure to manage all futures together,343 such suggestions do not
336. See supra note 107 (explaining the concept of a plaintiff's selfconsciousness in
the future injury context).
337. See supra note 321, 323 and accompanying text (describing the type of notice a
court would have to provide to alert ascertained futures).
338. At the point of injury manifestation, an unascertained future would become a
current injury plaintiff and, depending on the timing, could potentially be ineligible
for settlement funds altogether. See supra notes 3-4, 71-72 and accompanying text
(explaining the Agent Orange settlement and its time frame). Thus, although the
unascertained future becomes selfconscious at the point of injury manifestation, that
revelation could be too late to preserve any legal rights. See id. This Note's futures
subclass opt-in proposal is one possible way to manage futures, ex ante, to avoid this
very situation. For futures, the story of Isaacson and Stephenson shows that they
need to preserve their legal rights, if possible, before they become sick. See supra
notes 1, 233-39 and accompanying text (describing the two veterans who knew they
were exposed to Agent Orange, but remained ignorant of their exposure's legal
repercussions).
339. For example, one co-worker might remind another that, years ago, the
products they manufactured contained asbestos threads. But it is thoroughly
impractical, if not impossible, for courts to rely on exposure-aware futures to bring all
their friends, family and co-workers into exposure-awareness as well. However, an
effective, widespread court notice could possibly tip off some exposure-unaware
futures. See supra notes 321, 323 and accompanying text.
340. See supra note 125 (discussing Judge Wood's view that unascertained futures
do not belong in class actions).
341. See supra notes 261-62 and accompanying text (describing how too many
asbestos litigants in the tort system could undermine deterrence, shifting blame
around defendants only remotely connected to the offending industry).
342. See supra notes 257, 259-62 and accompanying text (describing the traditional
tort goals of individualized justice in mass tort class actions).
343. See supra notes 305-08 and accompanying text (explaining proposed
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to give future injury plaintiffs
"fair" settlements, adequate representation and notice). The fundamental problem
underlying these proposed amendments is that a settlement might be "fair" for some
futures, but unfair to others. See supra note 125 (explaining the inherent conflicts
among future injury plaintiffs). This problem suggests one of the most basic flaws of
the subclass cure: there is no practical, logical way for courts to administer justice to a
futures subclass of plaintiffs that may come into existence at any given moment,
exhibiting any number of injuries against any number of defendants. Thus, a practical
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account for the nuances between holders of future claims.3" Until
courts and commentators generate substantive proposals about how
to manage unascertained futures,345 those futures have a dismal class
action outlook,346 but possibly a bright future in the tort system.347
CONCLUSION
Isaacson and Stephenson have yet to receive any relief to
compensate them for their suffering. Their case is still moving
through the court system, and no subsequent courts have shed any
light on how to treat the Dow decision.348 Presumably, the 2001
Stephenson decision will permit Daniel Stephenson to sue the
chemical companies for the first time as a procedurally proper
litigant.3 49  However, there is the looming possibility that the
''government contract" affirmative defense will defeat Stephenson's
claims and he will recover no money. ° Although that defense might
operate as a hardship upon Stephenson, his case could be a small
setback within a larger victory.
After the Dow decision, future injury plaintiffs in long-latency toxin
application of the futures subclass cure tears apart its curative powers by possibly
invalidating the entire adequacy of representation function that the cure seemed to
preserve at first glance.
344. See supra notes 305-08 and accompanying text (explaining proposed
amendments in the Federal Rules to manage futures). Rather, these proposals seem
only to reinforce and codify the Supreme Court's findings that future injury plaintiffs
cannot adequately represent their interests in the same plaintiff class as current injury
plaintiffs without protections for diverging interests between futures. This Note
asserts that the proposed amendment does not help the futures problem because it
reminds courts to protect futures, but does not tell courts how to do so and,
importantly, does not recognize that different futures require different protections.
345. See supra notes 246, 263, 268 and accompanying text (explaining Professors
Hensler's, Mullenix's and Brickman's different proposals and commentary about
managing futures, none of which account for the differences between futures'
exposure-awareness).
346. See supra note 300 (explaining Judge Wood's pessimism that courts can
manage futures at all, whether or not in class actions).
347. See supra note 260 (explaining that plaintiffs suing individually can potentially
recover a large amount of money in the tort system).
348. See Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., No. 00-7455, 2003 WL 22227965, at *21
(2d Cir. 2003) (per curiam) ("With respect to the Stephenson plaintiffs, we remand
this case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with our panel
opinion." (citing Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2001))). Since
the Isaacson plaintiff sparked a federal removal jurisdictional problem, see supra note
241, the Second Circuit found that it had to remand Isaacson's claim to state court; he
requires a new ground for federal removal jurisdiction in lieu of the All Writs Act. See
Stephenson, 2003 WL 22227965, at *21 (citing Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v.
Henson, 537 U.S. 28 (2002) (holding that the All Writs Act did not provide proper
removal jurisdiction)). Therefore, Stephenson's next procedural step at the trial court
level is where a judge will presumably have to interpret the Dow decision.
349. See supra note 141 and accompanying text (explaining the Second Circuit's
holding in 2001 that the plaintiffs were not proper parties to the 1984 Agent Orange
settlement).
350. See supra note 66 (explaining the "government contract" defense).
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class actions may not have their own plaintiff subclass, but they will
probably have new opportunities and a new role in the tort system.
Courts might permit future injury plaintiffs who shared a plaintiff
class with the currently injured, before the Dow decision of 2003, to
perform a limited collateral attack to sue defendants for the first
time.35' Alternatively, courts may permit those futures to re-open
settlements premised on an overly inclusive plaintiff class, on a broad
theory of collateral attack.352 Using either theory, futures may have
windfalls coming in their direction should they choose to fight the
past.
If courts fashion class actions today and in the future with no
futures subclass, all holders of future claims may presumably litigate
when they manifest injuries, regardless of settlements purporting to
bind them. If courts fashion class actions using a modified futures
subclass, litigation might unravel differently.35 3 Either way, the courts
cannot tell sick plaintiffs that their cases are finished before they even
start.
351. See supra notes 110, 124-41 and accompanying text (explaining the Second
Circuit's theories about collaterally attacking to prove that a party was not present in
the first place).
352. See supra notes 147-63 and accompanying text (analyzing the general theories
of collateral attack that the Fifth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have suggested).
353. See supra notes 314-42 and accompanying text (describing this Note's proposal
of fashioning a futures subclass out of exposure-aware futures and leaving the
exposure-unaware futures in the tort system).
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